Nobody’s talking about how the rapidly approaching presidential election might affect the state of civil-military relations in this country. But we should be. The military in particular should be hoping for the best and preparing for the worst.
The election promises two possible outcomes, each with serious implications for the military, its relationship with the next commander-in-chief, and society as a whole: Either we will elect a commander-in-chief in the traditional mold—one who unselfishly respects norms and limits, seeks to preserve and protect the Constitution and the institutions of democracy, and exerts responsible civilian control over a professional military dedicated to serving the nation. Or we will usher back into office a commander-in-chief who regularly denigrates those in uniform, seeks to undermine and circumvent the Constitution and the institutions of democracy, and selfishly uses the military for personal and political gain rather than to serve the public or national interest.
The former electoral outcome promises to ensure the sustainment of a more-or-less stable equilibrium in civil-military relations in which all parties involved, notwithstanding any differences they might have, honor their constitutional obligations and respect behavioral, political, and ideological boundaries for the greater good. The latter electoral outcome, by contrast, will ensure that self-absorption, self-indulgence, and self-aggrandizement on the part of the commander-in-chief are permanently arrayed against the self-sacrifice, self-discipline, and self-respect of the military, thereby producing a perpetual state of ethical tension and upheaval for those in uniform.
Civil-military relations are grounded in a tacit but binding social contract of mutual rights, obligations, and expectations among the parties to the relationship. Perhaps the defining precept of sound civil-military relations is civilian control of the military, the understandable recognition that a profession that considers itself the Profession of Arms—whose distinguishing area of expertise is the management of violence—must be directed and overseen by duly elected and appointed civilian officials answerable to the people if it is to have legitimacy.
All civilian officials and military officers have sworn an oath to unreservedly support and defend the Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. For those in uniform, that oath is further underlain by their original enlistment oath, which swears them to obey the lawful orders—not ethical, prudent, or competent, but lawful—of those appointed over them. The paramount motive force behind these oaths is respect for and adherence to the rule of law.
Ironically, civilian control is neither defined nor even mentioned specifically in the Constitution. References to its purported Constitutional roots derive solely from the designation of the President as commander-in-chief in Article II, and, by implication, from the several enumerated military-related powers assigned to Congress in Article I.
Civilian control, properly exercised for reasons of state rather than for personal gain, owes its democratic character in large part to two defining principles of the military ethos: obedience to properly constituted authority and political neutrality. A power-hungry, power-driven commander-in-chief, motivated solely by self-interest at the expense of all else, would unreservedly exploit these deeply ingrained military imperatives to his own advantage, thereby reinforcing the steady accretion of power that has otherwise increasingly muscularized the presidency over time. Historian Arthur Schlesinger first awakened us to the imperial nature of the presidency. Others since have embraced the all-encompassing power they believe inheres in the so-called unitary executive.
It is more truth than truism that absolute power is likely to produce absolute corruption, and the concentration of power in any person or office is feedstock for tyranny. A thus-empowered commander-in-chief wouldn’t hesitate to employ any instrumentality, legal or illegal, ethical or unethical, that best serves his personal interests while disguised as serving the national interest. And he almost assuredly would claim personal ownership of a supplicant military to do his bidding.
Until recently, the quintessential vehicle for doing this was the Insurrection Act, which, because it doesn’t define what constitutes insurrection and doesn’t subject the president to checks by Congress, leaves him free to take unfettered action against political opponents easily labeled clear and present dangers and enemies of the state. Such individuals and groups are obvious targets for a military steeped in dutiful obedience to lawful orders and possessed of a penchant for defending the nation against internal and external threats.
The recent Supreme Court decision granting the president immunity from criminal acts in the conduct of official duties takes such presidential license to a whole new level. Since it’s almost impossible to conceive of any presidential use of the military as unofficial or private business, the military is left to ask itself whether the unquestioning obedience, compliance, and silence it has tacitly agreed to provide should continue to be unconditional, or whether such limitations and inhibitions should be conditioned on the public and private actions of the commander-in-chief.
All of this is to suggest that, depending on the results of the upcoming election, the military should be prepared to “lawyer up” in defense of its honor, integrity, and rights; to concern itself not merely with the legality, but also with the ethicality of the direction it receives; to scrutinize the motive and intent behind all such direction; and to fundamentally rethink its past orientation toward dissent and disobedience. Only by doing so, can the military expect to maintain its dignity and self-respect as an institution, while also preserving the binding social contract of civil-military relations.
Gregory D. Foster is a professor at the National Defense University, where he previously has served as J. Carlton Ward Distinguished Professor and Director of Research and as George C. Marshall Professor.
