The next National Defense Strategy—which was due to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth on Aug. 31—could not come at a more critical time, as Pentagon leaders seek to manage foreign-policy challenges, a stretched defense industrial base, and rapid technological disruption.
It would be fair to ask whether a lengthy document like the NDS still matters. After all, in just the first seven months of his second term, President Trump has ordered U.S. strikes against nuclear sites in Iran, engaged Russian President Vladimir Putin in high-stakes direct talks to seek an end to Moscow’s war in Ukraine, brandished sky-high tariffs against Beijing and dozens of other countries, sent thousands of U.S. troops to the Mexican border, deployed National Guard troops to support domestic law enforcement, unleashed a disruptive cost-cutting campaign across the U.S. government, and much more. It would be easy to conclude that these moves—in combination with public remarks from the president and other officials—have already defined the administration’s national-security priorities.
But having spent time in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we’ve seen firsthand that there is no substitute for comprehensive written guidance that outlines an administration’s vision for national defense. And given this administration’s unorthodox staffing and decision-making posture, a clear articulation of priorities is especially critical to the nearly 3 million military and civilian Defense Department employees worldwide.
If written and implemented effectively, there are five key ways the next NDS could be consequential for the second Trump administration’s approach to defense.
First, the NDS can help DoD leaders consistently prioritize threats and activities. A core feature of any NDS is its characterization of the threat environment facing the U.S. military. Its prioritization of those challenges shapes DoD’s force posture, modernization efforts, and the approach to seemingly routine activities. NDS can in turn indicate what not to prioritize and where to accept greater risk. Even in an environment where President Trump has played a uniquely personal role in the national-security decision-making process, the NDS can provide a guiding framework for officials across DoD and the U.S. military as they grapple with tough choices that do not reach a president’s desk or consider how to realize the president’s vision. For example, while the Trump administration has already indicated that protecting the U.S. homeland and deterring the People’s Republic of China will be top strategic priorities, the NDS can help determine the mechanics of tackling those challenges in practice.
Second, the NDS is a crucial messaging tool. As the president’s attention and messaging inevitably shifts with issues of the day, the NDS provides adversaries and allies alike with an enduring vision of the administration’s defense objections and intentions. Additionally, Congress can use the NDS to hold DoD accountable to its own stated goals and policy initiatives, with major implications for its authorities. In previous administrations, the Pentagon’s political leadership has also used the NDS to signal to the White House that they are focused on the president’s priorities. While Secretary Hegseth often uses media to publicly express his support for the president’s vision, the NDS gives him an opportunity to take his commitment one step further by incorporating it into one of the Pentagon’s core documents.
Third, the NDS can shape how DoD interacts with allies and partners. While the Biden-era 2022 NDS identified U.S. allies and partners as America’s “greatest global strategic advantage,” the Trump administration has repeatedly called for foreign capitals to do more for their own defense. The NDS could offer greater details on what DoD expects from allies and partners in terms of defense spending, specific capabilities, and commitments to use those capabilities in support of U.S. objectives. How the strategy characterizes the value of multilateral defense cooperation and whether it seeks to sustain frameworks like NATO, AUKUS, or multilateral ties in the Indo-Pacific region will also provide a critical signal for America’s partners around the world.
Fourth, the NDS can guide the Pentagon’s longer-term approach to long-term industrial and technological issues. The Pentagon already has a mandate from the White House to revitalize America’s maritime industrial base, reshore defense manufacturing, streamline defense acquisition processes, and promote tech innovation—along with historic amounts of funding to deliver results. But the NDS could provide greater insight into what types of capabilities, investments, workforce initiatives, co-development and co-production arrangements, and industry partnerships DoD believes are required to strengthen deterrence, readiness, and the U.S. military’s edge. How the strategy frames these issues will be especially pertinent for industry.
Fifth, the NDS can help justify the Pentagon’s requests for resources over the next three years. As the saying goes, a vision without resources is hallucination—and the NDS is no exception. That is why the previous administration undertook deliberate efforts to connect the 2022 NDS to the defense budget requests that followed. The NDS can provide a powerful blueprint for DoD leaders to explain to Congressional appropriators why they need resources, how they’ll be used, and how specific initiatives will achieve broader strategic objectives. An NDS that mirrors the fiscal year 2026 budget request and demonstrates that defense funds will advance articulated priorities can reassure Congress that the administration’s approach is coherent, consistent, and strategic.
President Trump continues to play a uniquely central role in national-security decision-making. DoD leaders would be well served by issuing an NDS that instructs the Pentagon how to realize the President’s vision, provides Congress a preview of the resources that will be required to achieve it, and signals to allies and adversaries the Administration’s commitment to the plan. But, as with all strategies, implementation will matter most of all.
Lauren Speranza is a Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), and a former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Chris Estep is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Asia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), and a former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs. The views expressed in this article are theirs alone.
