The Trump administration’s abandonment of alliances in favor of a transactional, unilateral foreign policy portends the end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The main reason that Germany, Japan, South Korea, other states have not developed independent nuclear forces is the U.S. security commitment. Now that the United States has weakened, questioned, or rejected those commitments, the rationale for nonproliferation has disappeared. U.S. policymakers should expect a rapid growth in the number of nuclear-armed states and a consequent increase in instability, insecurity, and conflict.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime was based on the consensus that a world full of nuclear-armed states would be more dangerous and less stable than a world in which only a few states possessed nuclear weapons. It is true that the United States and Russia, including in the Soviet period, never fought a direct armed conflict against each other, but neither did the possession of nuclear weapons eliminate each state’s fundamental sense of insecurity and threat. Deterrence likely prevented a third world war, but near-misses such as the Cuban Missile Crisis reinforced the idea that more states possessing more weapons created more risk of accidents, miscalculation, and war.
The impending age of nuclear proliferation will amplify this risk. The first wave of new nuclear states will include key American allies who face urgent security threats and possess many technical and financial resources: Germany, Japan, and South Korea. Others having the technical and financial resources to move quickly include Sweden, Poland, Turkey, Egypt, Canada, and Australia. Iran, of course, is well on its way, and a few countries—South Africa, Brazil and Argentina—that long ago gave up their nuclear-weapons programs could re-start quickly. Pakistan, India, and North Korea long ago demonstrated that strong motivation can overcome lack of funding and technology, and so other potential entrants into the nuclear club include Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Syria, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam.
The efforts of these aspirants to the nuclear club cannot remain hidden and will provoke reactions from both the existing nuclear powers and other states. During World War II, the Allies launched covert raids against Hitler’s nuclear program; since then, fears of new nuclear capabilities have led to violence on multiple occasions. These include Israel’s strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor, the Stuxnet cyber-attack on Iran’s nuclear program, and Israel’s strike against Syria’s covert reactor. During the Cold War, Moscow sought U.S. acquiescence for a Soviet attack on China’s nuclear program, and during the Clinton administration, the U.S. came close to military action against North Korea’s nuclear facilities.
In the same way, China, Russia, and North Korea will not idly accept Japan or South Korea as members of the nuclear club. The very idea of Germany or Poland as nuclear weapons states will rattle the Kremlin; and it is hard to imagine that the People’s Republic of China would tolerate Taiwan’s development of a nuclear option. Saudi officials have already warned that the Kingdom would acquire nuclear weapons if Iran acquires them—assuming Israel does not remove them first. These first-order conflicts will produce second-order unintended consequences, which could include everything from new alliances all the way up to hot war.
President Trump has created this new landscape of instability out of his belief that the existing post-Cold War global order was too costly. He has complained that allies were too expensive, and that previous administrations had exaggerated military threats, particularly from Russia. But as former allies seek security through new alliances and nuclear weapons, and adversaries and former adversaries take advantage to expand their power, the most likely outcome is a free-for-all comprising multiple nuclear-armed states. It is hard to see how this leads to greater security or wealth for the United States than the order it has rejected.
Glenn Chafetz is Director of 2430 Group, a nonprofit that researches state-sponsored threats to the U.S. private sector. He previously served in the CIA and State Department.
Zachary S. Davis is an author and former intelligence analyst and policy official.
