The often shadowy nature of mercenary activity makes exact numbers difficult to verify, but there has certainly been a resurgence in Africa’s use of hired soldiers in the past decade. Countries are increasingly drawing on them to help deal with violent extremists and other internal conflicts.
Africa’s past experience with mercenaries saw small groups – between 50 and 500 per intervention – assigned to short and sporadic missions. Now numbers are steadily rising.
In December 2020, Acting Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General and Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya, Stephanie Williams, reported that Libya alone harboured about 20 000 foreign forces or mercenaries. In 2022, an estimated 2 000 hired soldiers supported the Central African Republic’s (CAR) armed forces. Mali had nearly 1 645 contractors as of April 2023, and mercenaries have been reported in Mozambique, Sudan and Burkina Faso.
The inability of regional organisations to deal with security crises, and constraints facing mechanisms such as the African Standby Force, have led to an increasing reliance on private military contractors. Their functions range from training troops and providing advice in Burkina Faso and Niger to direct combat involvement in Mali and CAR, where the Russian Wagner group – now Africa Corps – is openly used.
While these countries argue that such arrangements offer positive security outcomes, recent killings of citizens in Mali by mercenaries raise concerns about their disregard for human rights norms during operations. Brutal and indiscriminate use of force has resulted in significant civilian casualties in countries where mercenaries operate, particularly northern Mali and CAR.
The African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) has repeatedly discussed the threat, underlining the pressing need to reinforce the 1977 Organisation of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. In December 2023, the PSC called for the review of the convention to be fast-tracked, and a draft is now open for input.
The 1977 convention contains an expanded definition of mercenaries and their activities based on the realities of the time that prompted its adoption. It notes the use of irregular contractors by external actors to remove political leaders considered obstacles to these actors’ interests. The convention treats mercenarism in Africa as an imported phenomenon rather than a homegrown one.
Even when private African groups such as Executive Outcomes emerged in the late 1980s –and participated actively in conflicts in Sierra Leone and Angola – the 1977 convention’s definitions of mercenaries and mercenary activities held up. Its focus on the private nature of mercenaries and provisions to hold contractors and hiring entities accountable remained fit for purpose until the late 2000s.
After that, the convention’s failure to anticipate state-owned or state-linked mercenarism in Africa became an issue. The ‘private’ status of contracted individuals or groups working on the continent has increasingly been questioned. Some operate openly or under the indirect control of other states, as is the case with Russian operators working for Africa Corps (previously Wagner). The best known groups – Wagner, Convoy and Redut – are associated with Russia’s defence ministry.
Africa also lacks a continental structure that provides oversight and helps to control mercenarism. As a result, there is limited follow-up by the AU on member states’ compliance with the 1977 convention or their support for domesticating its provisions.
The PSC-inspired review has produced a 40-article draft convention based on engagements with member states, African civil society organisations, international partners and a policy brief on the implications of mercenary activities for silencing the guns. The draft convention provides for an oversight committee on mercenarism and foresees a role for civil society to assist member states and the committee.
The draft convention also provides for monitoring and reporting by member states to ensure effective uptake nationally. And the definitions of mercenaries and their activities are being expanded in line with current realities on the continent.
The ongoing review is an important milestone in the AU’s effort to tackle mercenarism. But success will depend on establishing a strong oversight committee, and clarifying how it works with, and reports to, the PSC. Periodic briefings to the council should be included in the PSC’s yearly programme to ensure that mercenarism is managed at the highest decision-making level of the AU.
As the review committee finalises the draft convention, it should consider provisions for monitoring human rights abuses by mercenaries operating in conflict zones. These abuses should be referred to existing judicial frameworks, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, to ensure accountability for violations against civilians.
Written by Moussa Soumahoro, Researcher, Africa Peace and Security Governance, ISS Addis Ababa.
Republished with permission from ISS Africa. The original article can be found here.
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