Defence experts have accused the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) of spinning the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) as a success, and have slammed it as a disgraceful failure.
This follows a media briefing on 4 May in which Defence Minister Angie Motshekga and the Chief of the SANDF, General Rudzani Maphwanya, provided some details of the return of South African troops and equipment following the termination of the SAMIDRC mandate in mid-March. Motshekga and Maphwanya characterised the mission as a success in that it contributed to peace efforts in the Central African nation.
African Defence Review Director Darren Olivier said the mission “can only be considered a failure.” He explained that “SADC chose to withdraw SAMIDRC because it could no longer carry out its mandate or any other mission, as it was surrounded by M23 and Rwandan forces which had taken over Goma and the areas nearby. The mission failed.”
Defence expert Dean Wingrin determined that in order to evaluate whether the SAMIDRC mission was a success or not, its outcomes need to be assessed against its mandated objectives. The force’s mandate included restoring peace and security to prevent unnecessary loss of lives and properties as well as displacement of civilian population in the Eastern DRC, and to make the DRC and the SADC region at large stable from instability.
SAMIDRC was to neutralize negative forces and armed groups; support the DRC military (FARDC) with logistics and capability enhancement; aid humanitarian efforts and assist displaced persons; protect critical infrastructure; and protect civilians under threat.
To do this, SAMIDRC required a brigade plus force with maritime, air and artillery support capabilities, logistical support (road transport, repair & recovery capabilities, casualties evacuation, intelligence acquisition and Quick Reaction Force in support of the DRC.
SAMIDRC was deployed in December 2023 and was to number 5 000 troops, with South Africa providing a maximum of 2 900 troops, with the balance from Malawi and Tanzania. “It appears that SA provided far less soldiers (it still declines to say how many) and Tanzania sent a limited contingent of about 400 TPDF soldiers. Malawi sent troops. No air support capabilities were provided,” Wingrin noted.
The mission was terminated on 13 March 2025, after the fall of Goma in February. Rwandan-backed M23 rebels launched a lightning offensive in January, seizing Goma and Bukavu in February/March, further eroding the FARDC’s control, Wingrin pointed out. Following Goma and Sake’s fall, SAMIDRC soldiers were confined to base, under the watch of M23.
In terminating the Mandate of SAMIDRC, the Summit of 13 March noted “the continued deterioration of the security situation in the Eastern DRC, including the capturing of Goma and Bukavu, and the blockage of the main supply routes, making it difficult for humanitarian aid to flow.”
At the time the SADC terminated the SAMIDRC mission, there was no direct talks yet between the DRC and rebel groups, nor any ceasefire. There was to be a phased withdrawal, assisting M23 with opening Goma airport. By 11 April, the Chiefs of Defence summit noted that Goma airport was not going to open and developed a revised plan to withdraw via road, through Rwanda to Chato in Northen Tanzania, Wingrin explained. The next day, AFC/M23 demanded an immediate withdrawal (by end May). “A tentative ceasefire was only brokered from 23 April, thanks to US/Qatar intervention. This is way after the decision to withdraw SAMIDRC,” he noted.
In examining whether any of the SAMIDRC objectives were met, Wingrin pointed out that a far smaller force than envisioned, with no air support, was deployed. “This reduced force size and lack of air mobility limited attacking rebel advancements from the air, rapid reinforcement and medical evacuation.”
SAMIDRC was to support the Congolese military (FARDC) but “FARDC remained reliant on SAMIDRC support without showing marked improvements. Post-Goma reports indicate ongoing operational struggles against rebels.”
In terms of humanitarian assistance, Wingrin noted “reports of hundreds of civilians killed and 500 000 displaced in just two months leading up to withdrawal, exacerbating an already dire crisis. By March 2025, humanitarian access in captured areas remains constrained. Heavy fighting around Sake, Minova and Goma damaged airports, roads, bridges and health facilities.” In addition, there were reports of hundreds of rapes, looting and attacks on displaced civilians, even in SAMIDRC’s areas of operations. The total civilian death toll climbed into the thousands by early 2025.
Wingrin pointed to shortfalls in logistics as well as transport or attack helicopters as hampered SAMIDRC’s ability to neutralise armed groups, enhance FARDC effectiveness, deliver humanitarian relief, and protect civilians and infrastructure. “Although SAMIDRC achieved isolated tactical successes, the overall strategic environment in eastern DRC worsened.”
He emphasised that the M23 cemented control over major towns, the FARDC remains hamstrung, humanitarian suffering spiked, and civilians and infrastructure stayed at grave risk.
Considering the M23’s territorial gains, rising civilian suffering, and persistent instability, the SAMIDRC mission did not fulfil its mandate to restore peace, prevent loss of life, and stabilise the eastern DRC, Wingrin maintains. “Consequently, it cannot be considered a success.”
Olivier concurs, adding that “SAMIDRC was set up for failure from the start, without organic air support, without sufficient numbers, and without a Plan B for what to do should M23 and Rwandan forces break through FARDC lines. It was not designed to fight independently.”
According to Olivier, air support was never intended to be part of the mission, likely because it didn’t fit into the budget, and the planned structure was never going to get anywhere near 5 000 troops – it was likely 2 000-2 500 troops.
“As a result, SAMIDRC was not deployed with sufficient numbers, equipment, or in the right locations to be an independently operating manoeuvrable brigade, nor was it set up to independently defend areas rather than bases. Once FARDC resistance crumbled, SAMIDRC was left exposed,” Olivier explained.
“The bases chosen, for instance, were almost indefensible, and it’s a credit to the SAMIDRC troops that they held them until a ceasefire was negotiated. The base near Sake was a former UN base, in an exposed position. The airport bases were separated and isolated from each other. I can only imagine this was a budget-driven decision, but it was also hubris on the part of SADC as a whole and South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi in particular. They knew better and ignored the warnings coming from within their militaries about the massive risk of this approach.”
Olivier said that better options might have been to have used SAMIDRC to set up a more secure protective layer around the airport, to hold it indefinitely, or to have set up a more heavily protected base with an airfield further out, so as to provide options even if M23 swept FARDC forces in Goma.
“Instead, SADC and the three contingent countries approved a high-risk, under-resourced plan of action that blew up in their faces, humiliating them and resulting in the deaths of 17 soldiers, 14 of them South African. What did those soldiers die for? Delaying M23 by a few days?
“The dead and wounded, and all the others who are finally making their way home over the next few weeks, deserve better. They deserve to not only have their sacrifice acknowledged, but for the mistakes that led to that sacrifice despite no strategic victory to be punished,” Olivier sated.
“In yesterday’s briefing, and in other comments, we’ve seen South African military chiefs, the Minister of Defence, and other senior personnel laud SAMIDRC as a success claiming that it created the space for diplomatic talks. It did no such thing: it made those talks much harder. They forget that the entire point of the deployment was to protect Sake and Goma, and to prevent M23, Rwanda, or any other group other than the DRC government from controlling the area, to preserve the status quo, and therefore provide space for the Luanda and Nairobi peace talks.”
Olivier said that what Maphwanya and Motshekga are seemingly unaware of is that in trying to positively spin the withdrawal, they are negating the original intention to deploy SAMIDRC. “If M23 and Rwanda controlling Goma and Sake is an acceptable state, why did SAMIDRC need to deploy? Why did 17 soldiers have to die? In other words, if SAMIDRC had not been there, how would the outcome have been any different? M23 and Rwanda would still have taken Goma and Sake, the DRC would still have been forced to negotiate to them, and thousands of civilians would still have died. How is this success?”
Olivier called the spin a disgrace. “Trying to spin this positively, rather than acknowledging the failure and learning from it, is a disgrace. The South African, Tanzanian, and Malawian public deserve better. The soldiers, and the families of the dead soldiers, deserve better. The Congolese people deserve better,” he concluded.
