In the ongoing civil war that has ravaged Sudan since April 2023, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have achieved another milestone in their efforts to contest the Sudanese Armed Forces’ (SAF) dominance of the skies. On September 13, 2025, RSF air defences brought down a third Baykar Bayraktar Akinci high-altitude long-endurance unmanned combat aerial vehicle (HALE UCAV) over Al Khoei town in West Kordofan.
This event, verified through wreckage analysis, marks a pattern of successes for the RSF against one of the SAF’s most advanced assets. Images of the debris show distinctive elements like the nosecone, fuselage sections, wings, and control panels that match the Akinci’s design, leaving little doubt about the aircraft’s identity. The downing points to the RSF’s deployment of upgraded air defence systems in this region, which had previously seen less intense aerial activity compared to Darfur hotspots.
This latest incident builds on two prior victories that have eroded the SAF’s aerial advantage. The first Akinci fell on July 10, 2025, over El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, amid a fierce RSF push to capture the city. According to RSF statements, the drone had conducted multiple airstrikes that hit civilian infrastructure, including homes, medical facilities, schools, and displacement camps in areas such as Zamzam, Kuma, and Mellit. RSF spokesperson Al-Fateh Qarashi described the strikes as indiscriminate, emphasising the human cost to non-combatants caught in the crossfire. RSF forces engaged the UCAV with anti-aircraft fire, forcing it to crash and disrupting SAF operations in the besieged area, where ground fighting has persisted since mid-May 2024.
Just days before the third downing, in early September 2025, RSF commanders reported neutralising a second Akinci after it bombed the Manawashi market in South Darfur. The strike killed at least two people—a civilian woman and an RSF fighter—while wounding a market worker and another woman, both of whom needed urgent medical care. Witnesses speaking to local media outlets recounted the panic as people scrambled to aid the injured amid the rubble. RSF anti-aircraft units then targeted the drone, setting it ablaze in flight before it crashed into a residential area in Mershing, about 15 kilometres away. Remarkably, the impact caused no further deaths or major damage, but the event underscored the risks of urban warfare involving unmanned systems.
For the SAF, the Akinci has served as a cornerstone of their strategy to hold key territories, especially in Darfur and Kordofan, where RSF advances threaten supply lines and urban centres. These drones enable precise attacks on RSF artillery, convoys, and bases in places like Nyala, El Fasher, Geneina, and various Kordofan locales, allowing the military to project power without risking piloted aircraft. However, the repeated losses signal a turning point; the RSF’s growing proficiency in countering these platforms questions the long-term viability of the SAF’s reliance on unmanned strikes to maintain battlefield superiority.
The Baykar Bayraktar Akinci represents a leap in drone technology, tailored for demanding roles in asymmetric conflicts. Produced by the Turkish company Baykar, which has ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s family through co-ownership by his son-in-law, the Akinci measures 12.2 meters long with a 20-meter wingspan and stands 4.1 meters tall. It handles a maximum takeoff weight of 6,000 kilograms and can carry up to 1,350 kilograms of ordnance, sensors, or electronic warfare gear. Dual engines propel it to speeds of 361 kilometres per hour at maximum, with a cruising pace of 280 kilometres per hour. Capable of reaching 40,000 feet in altitude—though it typically operates around 30,000 feet—the drone’s range stretches beyond 7,500 kilometres, supported by endurance exceeding 24 hours for persistent surveillance or loitering strikes.
Engineered for reliability in hostile settings, the Akinci incorporates triple-redundant flight controls and fault-tolerant systems to withstand failures. Satellite communications enable operations far from ground stations, while its design includes low-observable features and electronic countermeasures to evade detection. In Sudan’s theatre, these attributes have allowed the SAF to execute missions that disrupt RSF logistics and fortifications, often with precision-guided munitions that minimise collateral damage if used judiciously. Yet, real-world combat exposes limitations; even with these safeguards, the drone remains susceptible to well-coordinated ground fire, particularly from radar-guided or infrared-seeking missiles that can lock onto its heat signature or radar profile during attack runs.
The RSF’s air defence evolution has been key to these intercepts. Early in the war, they leaned on rudimentary weapons like 23mm and 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns, paired with portable systems such as the Soviet SAM-7 or Chinese FN-6, which offered limited range against high-flying targets. Over time, foreign support has transformed this arsenal. Reports indicate the Russian Wagner Group provided surface-to-air missiles in 2023, as noted by U.S. Treasury sanctions, enhancing the RSF’s reach against drones and helicopters. Speculation surrounds the exact models—possibly advanced MANPADS or short-range batteries—but their impact is evident in the Akinci downings. The UAE also supplied Chinese-made FK-2000 air defence system to Sudan’s RSF.
Further bolstering comes from alleged United Arab Emirates involvement, with evidence from August 2025 showing Chinese-origin air defence systems reaching RSF hands, potentially violating global arms restrictions on Sudan. This influx has enabled more integrated defences, combining radar for early warning with missiles for engagement, shifting the aerial balance in contested zones. The UAE’s reported cooperation with the RSF over recent months aimed specifically at countering the SAF’s Akinci operations, though earlier attempts yielded few results until the string of successes in July and September.
On the SAF side, drone acquisitions have involved covert international dealings. A March 2025 Washington Post investigation, based on leaked records, revealed Baykar’s $120 million sale of drones and munitions to Sudan in 2023, including at least eight TB2 models and 600 warheads. Routed through third parties to evade U.S. and EU embargoes, these transfers may have included incentives like access to Sudan’s gold and copper resources for Turkish firms. Baykar has remained silent on the claims, while Turkey publicly advocates for peace talks.
Egypt has also contributed, delivering Bayraktar TB2 drones in October 2024 amid thawing Cairo-Ankara relations. These have targeted RSF assets in el-Gezira and Khartoum states, such as convoys near the Baka Bridge. In April 2025, a Turkish A400M aircraft arrived in Port Sudan, likely ferrying more Akinci components or related gear, sustaining the SAF’s fleet despite sanctions.
The RSF has not been passive; in May 2025, their own drone strikes on Port Sudan hit facilities training SAF operators with Turkish specialists, injuring some who were later repatriated. This tit-for-tat escalation highlights how both factions leverage foreign tech to prolong the fight, complicating diplomatic efforts to end the violence.
