ADF STAFF
A pair of major 2024 attacks against Malian security forces and Russian mercenaries has some Bamako residents on edge.
The sentiment in Mali’s capital is a departure from previous public displays of support for the ruling military junta led by Col. Assimi Goïta before the attacks and suggests that ongoing acceptance of the military might depend on its ability to provide security.
That is according to Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, director and senior fellow of the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) Africa Program, and Cameron Hudson, a senior fellow with the program.
The researchers produced a report based on interviews with civilian leaders representing youth, women, and various ethnic and regional groups; current and former politicians; independent journalists; local political analysts and academics; military officers; international diplomats; and representatives of international organizations based in Bamako.
The interviewees were questioned before and after the attacks, the first of which occurred in July 2024, when the al-Qaida-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Tuareg rebel fighters killed 47 Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) troops and 84 Russian mercenaries during a fierce three-day battle near the border with Algeria.
In September, JNIM killed at least 77 people during an attack on a military training school and international airport in Bamako, where Russian mercenaries are based. It was the first attack on Bamako since 2016.
The researchers wrote that Mali now is experiencing a “crisis of confidence” that existed under democratic rule and continues to undermine relationships between the military, lawmakers, civil society and civilians.
“Malians need a fundamentally new understanding of the role of the state, and the state needs to rethink its relationship and responsibilities toward its people,” Dizolele and Hudson wrote. “The possibility that this can be achieved in the near term under the country’s current political disposition appears remote.”
Mali’s fourth military coup installed the leadership of the Comité National pour le Salut du Peuple (CNSP) in 2020. The CNSP since has expelled French and United Nations forces.
The military has tried to influence public opinion through a combination of propaganda, disinformation, and increased restrictions on the media and civil society organizations. The goal is to control the narrative and maintain its hold on power, observers say.
Some interviewees argued that “civilians are drugged by the CNSP’s lies” and believe that the military was able to “poison society, making governance impossible and presenting themselves as the only option for ruling” by trimming public institutions and limiting civic space.
After the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) peacekeeping force was ordered out of the country in December 2023, terror attacks surged. From then until November 2024, attacks by extremist groups more than doubled, according to the Global Conflict Tracker.
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) reported that attacks on Malian civilians increased 38% since MINUSMA left, with the battles and attacks spreading to new areas in northern Mali. ACLED said the Malian Army and Russian mercenaries commit “torture, summary executions, beheadings, ejection of prisoners from aircrafts and the booby-trapping of corpses.”
The country’s security crises are combined with social and political issues, and the political analysts, members of civil society and democracy activists interviewed for the CSIS report contend that Mali’s military leaders have not offered solutions.
Many interviewees viewed the military as a de facto colonial actor acting in the defense and interests of its own elite class. Others argued that up to 90% of the present military are related to current officers. Thus, the military does not reflect the country’s tribal, regional or linguistic diversity.
“This nepotistic recruitment process has severely impacted the quality of both soldiers and officers,” Dizolele and Hudson wrote.
Under Goïta’s rule, no progress has been made to hold national elections. The junta most recently planned to hold elections in February 2024, but that was postponed indefinitely in September 2023 due to “technical reasons.”
“Only the most gullible were surprised by the announcement,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies analysts wrote.
Dizolele and Hudson offered several recommendations that could help Mali lay the groundwork for a return to civilian rule, including:
* Rebuilding trust between the state and civilians by depoliticizing the defense and security institution.
* Implementing confidence-building measures to help civilians identify with the defense and security institutions and vice versa by increasing civil-military cooperative actions and promoting dialogue.
* Increasing the number of security advisory committees — composed of civilians and security officials — and ensuring that participants can speak freely without reprisals.
* Creating platforms to allow conversations with civil society organizations on security and law and order.
* Training members of the National Assembly to build the expertise needed for effective oversight of defense and security institutions.
