The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has faced a storm of criticism and defence over its role in the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC), which ended in mid-March 2025.
At a media briefing on May 4, 2025, Defence Minister Angie Motshekga and SANDF Chief General Rudzani Maphwanya presented the mission as a success, emphasising its contribution to peace efforts in the DRC. They spoke as South African troops and equipment returned home following the mission’s termination, which came after the M23 rebel group seized Goma and Bukavu, key eastern cities, in February and March 2025. However, defence experts have fiercely contested this view, branding SAMIDRC a “disgraceful failure” that left the DRC weaker and cost the lives of 17 soldiers, including 14 South Africans. SAMIDRC launched in December 2023 with a mandate to restore peace, support the DRC military (FARDC), protect civilians, and aid humanitarian efforts in the eastern DRC.
The plan called for a brigade of 5,000 troops—South Africa contributing up to 2,900, alongside Malawi and Tanzania—backed by air, maritime, and artillery support. In reality, the force was far smaller, with South Africa providing fewer soldiers than promised, Tanzania sending about 400, and Malawi contributing an unspecified number. Crucially, no air support was deployed, a decision experts say doomed the mission from the start. By January 2025, M23 rebels, backed by Rwanda, launched a rapid offensive, capturing Goma and Bukavu. SAMIDRC troops found themselves confined to bases, surrounded by rebels, unable to act.
Darren Olivier, Director of the African Defence Review, argued that SAMIDRC was “set up for failure” due to insufficient troop numbers, poor planning, and indefensible base locations, like the exposed former UN site near Sake. He noted that the mission’s collapse forced the DRC into negotiations with M23 from a position of weakness, not strength, contradicting SANDF claims that it paved the way for diplomacy.
Dean Wingrin, another defence expert, pointed out that the mission failed its core objectives: peace was not restored, the FARDC remained ineffective, and humanitarian efforts crumbled as hundreds died and 500,000 were displaced by March 2025. Infrastructure was damaged, civilians faced rape and looting, and the death toll climbed into the thousands. Despite these critiques, General Maphwanya stood firm, insisting SAMIDRC “contributed to peace efforts” by facilitating mediation. He framed the withdrawal—completed via a challenging road journey through Rwanda to Tanzania—as a proud step in a broader peace process, not a retreat.
Motshekga echoed this, noting a peace agreement brokered with SADC, the African Union, and the East African Community, which included a ceasefire and disarmament commitments. Yet, Wingrin countered that this ceasefire, secured by the US and Qatar in late April, came too late to credit SAMIDRC, whose troops were mere “spectators” after Goma’s fall. The human cost weighs heavily: 17 soldiers died, and the SANDF has repatriated all casualties. As troops withdrew, leaving “not even a pin behind,” Maphwanya maintained the force’s readiness for future missions, despite budget cuts and equipment woes. The debate rages on—did SAMIDRC achieve a fragile peace, or was it a costly misstep that demands accountability? For now, opinions remain sharply divided.
