Mali has recently taken delivery of the first batch of 36 Norinco CS/VP14 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles from China, a move that strengthens the country’s military capacity as it contends with ongoing security threats.
Verified images reveal these vehicles being unloaded at a port in Guinea, from where they will travel by road to Mali. This shipment forms part of a larger order for 160 CS/VP14 MRAPs, reflecting Mali’s commitment to enhancing its armed forces amid a persistent insurgency that has plagued the nation for over a decade. The arrival of these vehicles, designed specifically to counter the dangers of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), marks a notable step in Mali’s efforts to modernise its military and adapt to the demands of asymmetric warfare.
The CS/VP14 is a robust 4×4 platform engineered for hostile environments. Capable of carrying up to 11 personnel, it offers protection against blasts of up to 8 kg of TNT, as certified under the STANAG 4569 Level 3b standard. For added versatility, the vehicle can be fitted with modular armour to shield its crew from 7.62 mm armour-piercing rounds, a feature that makes it well-suited to Mali’s conflict zones, where ambushes and roadside bombs are common.
Before this delivery, the Kenyan Army was the only known operator of the CS/VP14, suggesting that China has been selective in sharing this particular model with its partners. Mali’s acquisition of these vehicles points to a growing military relationship with Beijing, a trend that has become increasingly apparent in recent years. This latest delivery builds on a history of Mali diversifying its sources of military equipment to meet its security needs.
In 2019, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) transformed one of its infantry regiments into a mechanised unit, equipped with 29 South African-made Casspir MRAPs donated by Germany. Alongside the vehicles, Germany provided 4,100 bullet-resistant vests, 4,300 combat boots, and 2,700 ballistic helmets, an effort aimed at bolstering Mali’s fight against Islamic militants.
The following year, in February 2020, Mali received an unspecified number of South African Paramount Marauder MRAPs, further expanding its fleet of protected vehicles. By February 2021, the FAMa had taken into service a wide range of armoured platforms during a ceremony at the Kati military camp. These included at least six Chinese Norinco VN2C 6×6 infantry fighting vehicles, 50 Kia KM450 military trucks, Dongfeng EQ2050 multi-purpose wheeled vehicles, half a dozen BRDM-2 amphibious scout cars, a couple of BTR-70 8×8 amphibious armoured personnel carriers, and six Puma M36 armoured personnel carriers.
This mix of equipment, sourced from multiple countries, reflects Mali’s pragmatic approach to equipping its forces. China’s role as a supplier has grown markedly since then. In March 2023, under the leadership of Colonel Assimi Goïta, Mali acquired a substantial number of Chinese-made VP11 4×4 Lightweight MRAPs and Lynx CS/VP11 all-terrain vehicles, both produced by Norinco.
A video shared on social media captured a convoy of over 30 trucks transporting these vehicles through Bamako, the capital, offering a glimpse of the scale of this acquisition. Designed to enhance Mali’s counter-insurgency operations, these vehicles arrived at a critical time, following the withdrawal of French and European forces in 2022, which left the FAMa to shoulder greater responsibility for national security.
Just a few months later, in June 2023, a second batch of Chinese equipment reached Mali, including WZ-551 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles and additional VP11 MRAPs. Photographs showed a convoy of at least 70 trucks carrying these assets, which were offloaded at the port of Conakry in Guinea before making their way to Mali. This reliance on Guinea’s port facilities illustrates the logistical hurdles of supplying a landlocked country like Mali, where regional cooperation plays a vital role in military procurement.
Mali’s military partnerships extend beyond China. In January 2024, Russia delivered a considerable array of equipment, including at least five T-72B3 Obr.2023 main battle tanks fitted with protective cages, several Kamaz trucks, BMD infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-80A/82 armoured personnel carriers, Spartak armoured vehicles, a Linza 4×4 armoured ambulance, Typhoon-K trucks, Tigr tactical vehicles, artillery, small boats, and other weapons. Broadcasts on the local TV channel Cap Mali+ showcased dozens of trucks transporting this gear, accompanied by Russian advisors. These deliveries have solidified ties between Bamako and Moscow, offering Mali another avenue to address its security challenges as it navigates a complex geopolitical landscape.
The relationship with China, however, encompasses more than just military hardware. On 2 September 2024, Mali’s Transitional President, Colonel Assimi Goïta, visited Norinco’s headquarters in Beijing, a trip that coincided with preparations for the 9th Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC). Accompanied by Defence Minister Colonel Sadio Camara and other officials, Goïta toured the facility, viewing demonstrations of cutting-edge defence technologies such as light weapons, drones, and high-performance artillery systems.
The visit concluded with the signing of an agreement between Mali’s Ministry of Defence and Norinco for further military equipment, reinforcing the junta’s efforts to strengthen its armed forces amid ongoing instability. This instability traces back to 2012, when Tuareg separatists and jihadist groups seized northern Mali, triggering a conflict that persists despite international interventions, including a French-led operation in 2013.
The departure of French and European troops has since intensified pressure on the FAMa to secure the country’s vast, often ungoverned, territory. Beyond defence, Goïta’s trip to China included meetings with representatives from Gangfeng and Wang Kang, two companies investing heavily in Mali’s economy. Gangfeng’s President-General, Wang Xiaoshen, discussed the Goulamina lithium mining project, a joint venture nearing completion with equipment calibration underway and an inauguration planned for November 2024. Lithium, a key material for electric vehicle batteries, promises to generate substantial revenue—estimated at 110 billion to 115 billion CFA francs (roughly £140 million) annually—offering Mali a chance to fund development projects and address socioeconomic issues that fuel unrest.
Wang Kang, meanwhile, outlined plans to invest millions of dollars in cement, ceramics, lime, and iron production, initiatives expected to create over 3,000 permanent jobs and shift Mali from a cement importer to an exporter. An upcoming visit by Wang Kang’s CEO will formalise these commitments through a memorandum of understanding, deepening economic ties with China. These developments come as Mali seeks alternatives to Western partners, a shift driven by the junta’s rejection of perceived neo-colonial influence following the 2021 coup. France and the United States have voiced unease about China and Russia’s expanding presence in the Sahel, a region rich in resources and strategically positioned along migration routes. Yet, for Mali’s leadership, the priority remains clear: countering an insurgency that has spread from the north to the centre and into neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger.
The CS/VP14 MRAPs, with their ability to protect against IEDs and transport troops safely, align with this goal, potentially improving the FAMa’s effectiveness in the field. The delivery of these vehicles also sheds light on the practical challenges Mali faces as a landlocked nation. Using Guinea’s ports and overland routes has become a necessity, a system that worked for the CS/VP14s as well as earlier shipments like the WZ-551s and VP11s.
This arrangement not only demonstrates Mali’s dependence on its neighbours but also the scale of coordination required to sustain its military modernisation. In essence, the arrival of the CS/VP14 MRAPs from China is more than a single transaction—it reflects Mali’s broader strategy to fortify its defences and foster economic growth through partnerships with non-Western powers. As the first batch of 36 vehicles begins its journey from Guinea to Mali, with 124 more to follow, the FAMa gains a practical tool to confront its adversaries. Coupled with China’s investments in lithium, cement, and infrastructure, these efforts could reshape Mali’s future, offering both security and opportunity in a region long defined by conflict. Whether this approach will yield lasting stability remains uncertain, but for now, Mali is forging ahead, balancing immediate needs with long-term ambitions.
