The scale of casualties suffered by the Wagner group and Malian forces during a recent assault in the Tinzaouaten region reveal vulnerability in Mali’s counterinsurgency posture.
The attack was reported in the media as the biggest loss for Russian paramilitaries in several years of operating in Africa.
Although there are conflicting reports, at least 80 Russian mercenaries and an undisclosed number of Malian soldiers were killed in an ambush by Tuareg rebels operating alongside the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin – an al-Qaeda affiliate in the Sahel.
The crisis in Mali has four layers.
They are the protracted Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali; terrorism by jihadist groups; communal conflict; and military incursion into politics, which has kept some stakeholders out of governance.
The situation hasn’t improved in spite of a 2020 military coup. The coup leaders claimed that they intervened to prevent further chaos. They exploited anti-French sentiment to garner support from citizens.
But Mali continues to witness repeated terror attacks and there is a resurgence of rebellion.
As scholars of security and strategic studies, we have been researching violent extremism, terrorism, insurgency, crisis management and state fragility in Africa.
We argue that in spite of the populist rhetoric by Malian military government and some recent success, there are at least three reasons for the continuing insecurity.
One is the government’s inability to adapt to the changing dynamics of counterinsurgency operations. Second is the failure to appreciate the significance of terrain and air capability. And lastly, there is the limited military assistance and foreign influence undermining counterinsurgency operations.
To turn the tide against rising insecurity, Malian counterinsurgency forces must adapt and respond effectively to these factors.
Incidents of attack
Following the coup, the Mali-led junta severed ties with France. It also masterminded the exit of the UN mission from Mali, and strengthened security cooperation with Russia.
It also championed the Liptako-Gourma Charter that birthed the Alliance of Sahel States established with Burkina Faso and Niger.
The emergence of the Alliance of Sahel States led to the division of west African states into two blocs: the pro-west and liberal democratic group, and the pro-Russian and junta-led group.
Despite their pledge to enhance security in the area, incidents of political violence in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have collectively risen by 5% in 2023 (a 46% increase from 2021).
As reported by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data, there has been a 38% rise in violence directed at civilians in Mali in 2023.
The primary groups responsible for these assaults are Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin and IS Sahel.
The Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin has carried out extensive attacks on military installations and blockaded towns and key transport routes.
Insurgencies often evolve over time. If the counterinsurgency forces fail to adapt or respond effectively to these changes, they can become less effective.
The conflict in northern Mali has intensified. Battles and attacks are occurring in new regions, as a result of military actions and the involvement of the Wagner Group.
The situation is made worse by the resurgence of armed confrontation with the Tuareg rebels who in 2015 had agreed to the Algiers Accord to end the Mali war.
To understand the failure of Mali’s counterinsurgency operations in its northern region, it is crucial to examine the geographical context.
Mali is on the western flank of the Sahel, a broad buffer between north and sub-Saharan Africa, both geographically and culturally. This region of Africa makes up a major zone of ungoverned spaces.
Northern Mali lies within this zone, and the location of the recent ambush is an expansive area with limited state presence where jihadi and Tuareg factions have been active for an extended period.
Terrain and air capability
Mali is dry and mostly flat. The northern border with Algeria spans 2,000km and is poorly secured. The nature of these frontiers makes it easier for the insurgents to see an approaching enemy in advance.
The Malian military doesn’t have sufficient resources and advanced military assets to replace the security architecture placed at its disposal by defunct multilateral and bilateral military missions.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the country’s air capabilities.
Air power is central to counterinsurgency operations. Light attack aircraft, helicopters and combat drones are key to providing close air support in an effective and timely manner.
They also have to remain present in the combat area and promptly respond to emerging threats on a fluid and unpredictable battlefield.
Mali’s armed forces have, in recent years, received a range of military equipment, from armoured vehicles and helicopters to C295 light transport aircraft.
In 2022 Bamako received some Russian ground-attack aircraft and attack helicopters.
Mali has some 2,000 personnel in its air force, with 20 combat capable aircraft and seven attack helicopters.
Limited military assistance and foreign influence
With the departure of international military support missions, any progress made in the last decade towards improving general military capability of the country is now at risk.
This is because Mali has moved from multiple military partnerships to a sole dependence on Russia. Russia is currently incapable of providing support to Mali due to the war in Ukraine, which has forced the Kremlin to scavenge for armaments in Iran and North Korea.
Finally, Mali’s counterinsurgency operation underestimated the possible role of foreign actors. Foreign actors can give rise to strategic and operational failures in military operations through proxy warfare, supply chain disruption and encouraging defections, among others.
For instance, Ukraine’s military intelligence agency has claimed that it was involved in the recent ambush of Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries.
Way forward
As junta-led Mali struggles to fend off threats from various armed non-state actors, its counterinsurgency approach requires an overhaul.
Attention should focus on the fragility of the state, porosity of its border, strained military capabilities, and geopolitical fallout from the Russian-Ukraine crisis.
Written by Oluwole Ojewale, Regional Coordinator, Institute for Security Studies, Freedom C. Onuoha, Professor of Political Science, University of Nigeria, and Samuel Oyewole, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of Political Sciences, University of Pretoria.
Republished with permission from The Conversation. The original article can be found here.
