Allied Forces of the Congo-March 23 Movement (AFC-M23) rebels claimed on November 15, 2025, to have shot down a Chinese-made CH-4 drone operated by Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government forces in Walungu, South Kivu province. Images released by the group showed wreckage including remnants of an AR-1 or FT-10 laser-guided munition, suggesting the drone carried precision ordnance for strikes against rebel positions. Days earlier, on November 10, AFC-M23 announced another CH-4 downing in Masisi, North Kivu, where debris scattered across contested terrain. These incidents mark the latest in a series of claimed losses for Kinshasa’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) fleet, deployed to counter M23 advances that captured Goma in January 2025 and Bukavu in February.
The CH-4, a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV produced by the China Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics, entered DRC service in 2023 as part of a nine-unit order announced in February that year. The initial three arrived in May, with the balance completing delivery by December 2023. Based at Kavumu airport, 30 kilometres south of Bukavu, the drones provide reconnaissance and attack roles over the Kivu conflict zone. Weighing 1,330 kilograms at takeoff, the CH-4 achieves 30-hour endurance at 5,000 meters altitude, with a 345-kilogram payload for up to six air-to-surface missiles or bombs. Operators favour the AR-1, a 35-kilogram semi-active laser homing missile with 8-kilometre range and a 10-kilogram warhead, for its accuracy against vehicles or fortifications, though high-altitude operations limit low-level evasion in forested Kivu valleys. Trade-offs include vulnerability to electronic warfare; the drone’s satellite link allows beyond-line-of-sight control but exposes it to jamming, a tactic M23 employs with Rwandan-supplied systems.
Prior losses underscore these risks. In January 2024, AFC-M23 reported downing a CH-4 near Rutshuru, North Kivu, with spokesperson Willy Ngoma releasing video of twisted airframe sections. Kinshasa dismissed it as propaganda, claiming the footage depicted a 2022 MONUSCO helicopter wreck. A second claim followed in February 2024, when political spokesperson Lawrence Kanyuka stated M23 forces neutralised a drone over Masisi using man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS). The DRC armed forces (FARDC) did not confirm either, but United Nations observers noted increased rebel anti-air activity. By November 2025, these incidents had depleted at least four of the nine CH-4s, forcing reliance on spares and limiting sortie rates to two per day amid maintenance strains in humid conditions that corrode avionics.
Escalation peaked on December 5, 2025, when AFC-M23 claimed to have downed a Bayraktar TB2 UAV near Luvungi, South Kivu, minutes after its takeoff from Bujumbura International Airport in Burundi. Local witnesses described explosions and debris strewn through wooded terrain near the DRC-Burundi border, where M23 probes test FARDC lines. The TB2, a Turkish medium-altitude long-endurance tactical UAV, supports surveillance and precision strikes with 27-hour endurance, 200-kilometre range, and 150-kilogram payload for laser-guided munitions like the MAM-L. At 12 meters wingspan and 650 kilograms, it cruises at 4,000 meters, integrating electro-optical sensors for real-time targeting, but its unstealthy design yields a 10-square-meter radar cross-section, detectable by low-end systems. Burundi’s basing enables cross-border ops, yet exposes the drone to border air defences; M23’s hit likely used shoulder-fired missiles, compressing the TB2’s 15-minute vulnerability window post-launch.
The TB2 entered DRC inventory in 2023 alongside CH-4s, with six units acquired for eastern patrols. Proven in Libya and Ukraine, where over 20 fell to Russian defences by February 2025, the platform excels in permissive airspace but falters against integrated air defences. In Kivu’s cluttered electromagnetic spectrum, rebels jam GPS for 30% of flights, forcing inertial navigation that drifts 500 meters over 100 kilometres, degrading MAM-L accuracy from 3 meters to 50. FARDC operators mitigate this via redundant links, but battery limits curtail loiter time to 12 hours in contested zones. The December loss, unconfirmed by Kinshasa as of December 6, 2025, strands the remaining fleet at half strength, verified through serial number tracking by open-source analysts.
These shootdowns expose M23’s growing anti-air edge, bolstered by Rwandan Defence Force (RDF) support. A February 2024 United Nations document detailed a “suspected RDF mobile surface-to-air missile” firing at a MONUSCO observation drone without impact, marking the first confirmed use of such systems in the theatre. RDF’s WZ551-based launchers, with a 15-kilometre range, neutralise MALE threats at standoff distances, shifting air superiority from FARDC. Kigali denies involvement, but experts estimate 3,000-4,000 RDF troops embedded with M23’s 3,000 fighters, providing training and MANPADS like the 9K38 Igla. This integration grounds 70% of FARDC air sorties, per MONUSCO logs, amplifying ground losses where M23 holds Goma, Bukavu, and mining hubs like Rubaya.
The incidents coincide with U.S.-mediated peace efforts. On December 4, 2025, Presidents Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame signed the Washington Accords at the Trump Institute for Peace, committing to RDF withdrawal, M23 disarmament, and economic ties over minerals like coltan. The pact builds on a June framework, promising $5 billion in U.S. investment, but excludes M23 from talks, stalling Doha negotiations. Clashes persisted in Kaziba on signing day, with FARDC drones bombing M23 sites, underscoring fragile implementation.
