The attack on the well-fortified Koutoukale prison in Niger’s Tillabéri Region on 11 July followed two failed attempts in 2016 and 2019. In this year’s incident, an undisclosed number of inmates escaped from the jail, which houses Islamist militants, among others.
No group publicly claimed responsibility for the latest prison break. However North East Nigerian sources told ISS Today that there were ongoing talks between Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) for the return of ISWAP’s members freed in the attack. This suggests that JNIM, operating in the Sahel, may have been responsible.
This latest incident came two years after a similar ISWAP attack in Abuja, Nigeria – the 5 July 2022 Kuje jailbreak. In March this year, Nigeria’s House of Representatives held a hearing into the whereabouts of escapees from that attack, in which 879 prisoners, including 68 Boko Haram members, were freed. Some 544 are still at large.
Following the Kuje jailbreak, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) reported that a Boko Haram prisoner who had a cellphone had communicated with members of the group outside. Ongoing ISS research into the Boko Haram conflict and the group’s leadership structures suggests that the detainee, who escaped in the prison break, is now head of ISWAP’s Timbuktu Wilayat (province) in the Lake Chad Basin.
At the March House of Representatives hearing, a Nigerian army representative reportedly said two problems had contributed to the success of the jailbreak – and that the army had repeatedly brought these to the prison authority’s notice. These were the low perimeter fencing and the absence of closed-circuit television (CCTV).
But a higher fence couldn’t have prevented the jailbreak, given that the attackers used explosives to bring down part of the fence. When the incursion started, the army had just withdrawn its soldiers as part of their rotation at Kuje prison. The attack lasted more than an hour without reinforcement from security forces, and the perpetrators and detainees got away fast.
It is also doubtful that CCTV would have prevented the incident. To be useful, the monitors would have required the dedicated attention of security and intelligence personnel. Considering all these factors, the attack is unlikely to have succeeded without inside help, not least from the detainees.
Among those who have left ISWAP, the ISS spoke to some who participated in the first ever Boko Haram jailbreak in Bauchi State in 2010, which freed over 100 members. They said the group had spent months collecting intelligence by deploying dozens of local young men and boys around the prison, police stations, the Emir’s palace and market, among others. They blended in by engaging in various trades, giving them the perfect cover.
Boko Haram’s late leader, Abubakar Shekau – then holed up in Kano receiving treatment for gunshot wounds from the 2009 internal uprising that led to group founder Mohammed Yusuf’s death – gave each youth ₦40 000 (then US$263) to start up these businesses.
A failure of intelligence in the Kuje incident meant that measures such as CCTV and high walls could have done little to prevent the assault. A few weeks afterwards, the Speaker of Nigeria’s House of Representatives disclosed that the State Security Service had received 44 reports about the raid before it happened. Earlier, the failure to act on similar intelligence resulted in the fatal Abuja-Kaduna train attack by a joint Boko Haram-bandit team in Nigeria’s North West.
While claiming responsibility for the Kuje incident, ISWAP assured its members in other detention facilities of its commitment to free them. Three months later, it attempted a similar attack on a military facility holding high-profile group members in North Central Nigeria. Soldiers managed to foil that incursion.
The targeting of detention facilities in Niger and Nigeria, and the recent ISWAP promotion of the Kuje escapee, reassure those behind bars in these countries and beyond that insurgents, especially ISWAP, don’t abandon their members.
The implications extend beyond the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel. In East and Central Africa, violent extremist groups may be inspired by the successes of their West African counterparts. This calls for better intelligence and improved security at facilities holding terrorism suspects.
It also requires cross-border collaboration, because violent extremism can no longer be treated as simply a national problem. That should include sharing best practices to prevent jailbreaks, and intelligence to track escaped detainees. Boko Haram has demonstrated its ability to use cross-border linkages to move supplies or fighters, including the Kuje prison escapees, who arrived on the Lake Chad islands through Niger. If successful, ongoing talks between ISWAP and JNIM could also see attempts to move escapees across borders.
Relations between Niger and Nigeria are strained after seven months of sanctions on Niger by the Economic Community of West African States and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States by Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. Nevertheless, these countries must find a way to work together to counter terrorism, including the threat posed by prison breaks.
Written by Malik Samuel, Researcher, ISS Regional Office for West Africa and the Sahel.
Republished with permission from ISS Africa. The original article can be found here.
