The landscape of armed conflict in Africa is evolving rapidly, with advanced technologies once confined to major global wars now appearing in regional insurgencies.
In the dense forests and rugged terrain of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the M23 rebel group has begun deploying fibre-optic first-person view (FPV) drones in South Kivu province. This development marks a notable shift in tactics, suggesting that the Congolese armed forces, known as FARDC, possess electronic warfare capabilities capable of disrupting conventional radio-controlled drones. Such equipment represents a new milestone for the DRC military, which has historically lagged in sophisticated countermeasures.
These fibre-optic FPV drones operate through a tethered system, relying on a thin physical cable to relay video feeds and control commands between the operator and the aircraft. Unlike traditional FPV drones that depend on radio frequencies, this setup uses light signals transmitted via optical fibres, ensuring seamless communication even in environments hostile to wireless signals. The technology has gained prominence in the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia, where it serves as a counter to pervasive jamming efforts. Yet its potential extends far beyond combat; engineers have explored similar systems for inspecting confined spaces like tunnels or pipelines, where radio waves falter due to interference or physical barriers.
The appeal of fibre-optic drones lies in their robust defences against modern electronic threats. Because signals travel along a secured cable, they remain impervious to jamming devices that flood the airwaves with noise to sever connections. This immunity allows operators to maintain control in contested areas where adversaries deploy electronic warfare tools. Moreover, these drones produce no radio emissions, rendering them nearly invisible to detection systems that scan for electromagnetic signatures. Adversaries equipped with radar or signal interceptors find it challenging to locate or track them, granting a stealth advantage in surveillance or strike missions.
Reliability forms another core strength. The optical connection delivers high-bandwidth data without the interruptions common in wireless setups, providing crisp, real-time video that aids precise navigation. In cluttered settings such as urban zones or thick vegetation, where radio signals might scatter or weaken, the cable ensures consistent performance. Operators can guide the drone at low altitudes, hugging the ground to evade visual or radar detection, which enhances its utility for covert operations. While the tethered range is typically limited to a few kilometres, it suits the close-quarters engagements typical of insurgent warfare.
In the DRC, this innovation arrives amid one of the region’s most protracted and lethal conflicts. The M23, supported by Rwanda, clashes with a coalition of government forces and allied militias, with fighting fueled by access to mineral resources and ethnic tensions. Both sides have ramped up their arsenals, incorporating drones to extend their reach. The DRC government has procured unmanned systems from suppliers in Bulgaria, China, and Turkey, including six CH-4 combat drones and the much larger Wing Loong II MALE drones from China. These fixed-wing platforms can deploy bombs or missiles, bolstering aerial strike capabilities. Accusations fly between combatants, with each claiming the other targets civilian areas with drone attacks, heightening fears of a broader regional escalation involving neighbouring states.
On the other hand, Rwanda operates a Polish counter-UAV system. The African country is to acquire the SKYctrl and FIELDctrl anti-drone systems from the Polish company Advanced Protection Systems (APS). The systems are designed to detect, track and neutralise unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that pose a threat to the security and sovereignty of the country.
The adoption of fibre-optic FPVs by M23 signifies a tactical adaptation to FARDC’s growing electronic defences. If rebels resort to tethered drones, it implies that standard FPVs face effective jamming, a capability the Congolese military has not previously demonstrated at scale. This evolution reflects a broader trend across Africa, where drone warfare spreads from state militaries to non-state actors. Insurgent groups leverage these tools for reconnaissance, propaganda dissemination, and precision strikes, often at a fraction of the cost of manned aircraft.
Beyond the DRC, similar adaptations appear in other hotspots. In the Sahel, groups like the Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) and the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) employ drones against security forces equipped with jammers. Tuareg fighters have used fibre-optic variants in ambushes on the African Corps, a Wagner Group successor operating in the region, where electronic warfare disrupts conventional operations. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab integrates drones into its asymmetric campaigns, exploiting the technology’s low entry barriers to challenge better-resourced opponents. Likewise, the Islamic State in Mozambique and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as the Rapid Support Force (RSF) in Sudan, have used commercially available drones in their operations.
This proliferation democratises advanced warfare, empowering smaller factions against established armies. Fibre-optic FPVs, in particular, offer insurgents a cost-effective means to bypass anti-drone measures. Produced from commercial components, these systems require minimal expertise to assemble and deploy, making them accessible to groups with limited funding. They enable targeted attacks on high-value assets, such as vehicles or command posts, while minimising exposure to counterfire. For African conflicts, often characterised by fluid frontlines and resource constraints, such drones tilt the balance toward agility over sheer firepower.
African governments respond unevenly to this challenge. Some militaries have invested in counter-unmanned aerial systems, including jammers, though adoption proceeds at a measured pace due to budgetary and training hurdles. The DRC’s apparent fielding of electronic warfare gear against M23 signals progress, yet gaps persist in coverage and integration. As insurgents innovate with jam-resistant technologies, states must accelerate their defences to maintain superiority.
The rise of fibre-optic FPV drones in Africa illustrates how global innovations reshape local battles. What began as a niche solution in Eastern Europe now influences outcomes in the Congo Basin and beyond, forcing all parties to adapt. As conflicts persist, the interplay between offensive drones and countermeasures will define the next phase of warfare on the continent, with implications for stability and humanitarian conditions.
