South African National Defence Force (SANDF) soldiers deployed on international missions – notably to Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) – feel let down by logistical failures, insufficient training, a lack of equipment, and organisational challenges. These affected not only their ability to perform their own duties, but their own safety and welfare during deployment.
This is according to research funded by the Open Society Foundations and carried out by Stellenbosch University*. The findings were presented at a recent seminar on Security and Rights: The Changing Security Landscape, Oversight and the Responsibility to Protect, held at the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study (STIAS).
Lindy Heinecken, Professor of Sociology in the Sociology and Social Anthropology Department at Stellenbosch University, said one of the research project goals was to identify the challenges facing peacekeepers deployed in multidimensional peace operations. Some 67 members of the SANDF with experience on international deployments were interviewed, from rifleman to major general.
Col (Dr) Laetitia Olivier, Research Fellow at Stellenbosch University, said the findings are not criticisms but realities. “It’s not nice to hear these issues, but the only people who can do something about it is ourselves. We have to take care of our soldiers on the ground.”
Inadequate training
In their interviews with SANDF members, researchers identified several key areas of concern. While most felt that their training prepared them adequately for combat, there was a general feeling that mission-readiness training lacked specificity and realism in that it did not prepare them well for what they experienced on deployments to places like Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Mozambique. Jungle warfare training has been carried out in Port St Johns and Entabeni, but these are forests, not jungles, and provide limited preparation for the hot and humid DRC environment.
Photo: Guy Martin
Soldiers said training focused mainly on peacekeeping and not peace enforcement, with not enough attention to civil-military interaction. Specifically with respect to the “human terrain” they felt they could benefit from a greater understanding of the social, cultural and political dynamics on the ground. They outlined the difficulties when it came to the protection of civilians. “How do you protect people in a village when belligerents are hiding amongst them?” soldiers asked.
SANDF members highlighted a need for training on unconventional threats like improvised explosive devices (IEDs), extreme weather conditions, and endemic diseases. They also recommended taking lessons from after-action reviews (especially from previous deployments), and called for more of a focus on interoperability, specialised skills, and unit training.
A major concern was how training is being watered down due to the lack of funding, which affects mission readiness. For example, at the SA Army Combat Training Centre (CTC) at Lohatlha, soldiers were told to pretend that one tank represented ten, and due to budget limitations, they were sometimes only allowed to fire four or five rounds during training.
Logistical failures
Organisational and logistical failures hamper not just training but deployments. Short notice and hastily planned deployments resulted in insufficient time to obtain uniforms and equipment. The widespread lack of equipment was cited as a major problem, including vehicles, night vision goggles, maps, weapons, bullet-resistant jackets etc. – for example, soldiers sometimes had to take turns wearing body armour on patrols as there was not enough for everyone. Soldiers have been routinely forced to purchase their own boots, tents and personal equipment – “a fundamental failure of state responsibility”, Olivier said.
Logistical support is consistently described as “being in a state of collapse”, forcing soldiers to rely on themselves. Very high levels of unserviceability of vehicles and maintenance support mean that a large percentage of vehicles are unserviceable upon arrival in the mission area. During the deployment to Mozambique, for example, commanders often had only enough vehicles to either go on patrol or fetch supplies, not do both.
The SANDF suffers from obsolete equipment, Olivier said, with a notable lack of surveillance equipment, night vision goggles, unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic communications, electronic warfare equipment etc. In the DRC, troops said opposing forces were often better armed and equipped than they were (possessing high calibre weapons, missiles, and long-range mortars), and that South African troops were outgunned from the start.
Sustainment and supply chain failures were, according to Olivier, experienced over and over again. The ordering and delivery of spares was too slow, inefficient, and sometimes incorrect: the ‘pull’ system of ordering as needed is ineffective, leading to critical shortages of food, fuel, and spares. Logistical flights from South Africa have been too few and far apart, forcing reliance on foreign or local sources. “For years we’ve spoken about forward bases in Africa – nothing has come of it,” Olivier said.
Environmental challenges
Tactical and environmental challenges faced by soldiers on deployments include hostile terrain, adverse weather and environmental conditions, base vulnerability, and unusual safety hazards such as snakes and natural gas pockets. In places like the DRC, the heat, humidity, and continuous rain are hard on people and equipment, with soldiers easily becoming dehydrated, and equipment such as boots and tents not handling the environment well or prematurely wearing out. Troops reported a lack of protection and basic welfare – in the DRC particularly, they faced substandard living conditions, having to survive on one meal a day while under M23 rebel control, for example. Soldiers often had to ask civilians to draw cash for them so they could buy their own food.
Base vulnerability was flagged as a major issue in the DRC, as there were no funds to establish new bases, forcing reliance on old and poorly sited bases. For example, at Sake, the base backed against a lake and was surrounded by high ground that the rebels controlled. South African soldiers thought that the other troop contributing countries to the Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) – Malawi and Tanzania – had better-equipped bases, undermining morale.
Joint operations shortcomings
Cultural and organisational friction was experienced when working with multinational forces, with South African soldiers finding diverse cultures and language barriers hindering operations. Different countries had variances in risk tolerance and divergent views on command authority. Friction was also experienced with host countries Mozambique and the DRC: host militaries were often seen as untrustworthy and unreliable, leaving troop contributing countries to fight alone.
Apart from the host nation’s unreliability and hostility, SANDF members found that other troop contributing countries had very different approaches to peacekeeping. Some operated under outdated passive peacekeeping doctrines that were less effective than peace enforcement actions, while other countries were viewed as being in missions purely to make money, with troops refusing to participate in offensive action or escort under fire, placing the burden of high-risk missions on some troop contributing countries – like South Africa.
Soldiers, particularly in the DRC, found the protection of civilians extremely difficult, as it was hard to distinguish rebels from civilians, and rebels would often fire mortars from civilian areas, knowing that peacekeepers could not return fire. Adversaries would often discard their uniforms and use civilians as shields. Soldiers also found it difficult to engage child soldiers due to moral and ethical concerns and rules of engagement.
Fragmented situational awareness and a lack of actionable information were highlighted by soldiers as serious problems, particularly the centralisation of intelligence in Pretoria through Defence Intelligence (DI). This centralisation slowed down the processing and sharing of intelligence, which has cost lives already, Olivier said, emphasising the need to allow SANDF arms of service to collect and process their own intelligence once again. Centralised intelligence also compounded command and control, with command lines too long, delaying decision-making.
Psychological challenges
Heinecken further highlighted some of the other problems confronting peacekeepers, emphasising the emotional and psychological challenges soldiers face on deployments, such as restrictive rules of engagement that sometimes make it difficult to intervene, stress and anxiety from witnessing atrocities, and language barriers and trust deficits with local communities.
Many experienced what is called “the peacekeeper syndrome”, a psychological condition that can affect soldiers deployed in international peacekeeping operations. It often arises when they feel unable to respond to atrocities, violence, or injustice due to strict Rules of Engagement (ROE). Heinecken said that in Mozambique, for example, soldiers encountered decapitated bodies, and in Sudan witnessed atrocities before their eyes but did not have the authority to intervene. In the DRC, an incident was cited where ADF rebels punished villages supportive of the United Nations by chopping off the children’s hands and feet to punish the parents. Many soldiers felt reporting atrocities was a waste of time as there would be no consequences to those committing the crimes.
Heinecken said soldiers need to be more regularly rotated for their physical and mental wellbeing. In the DRC, for example, rotations now take place once a year as opposed to once every six months in an effort to lower deployment costs. She said the SANDF is failing to provide adequate medical and psychological support before, during and after deployments – leading to PTSD, relational stress, and even suicide.
Leadership and command
Expanding on leadership and command failures, Heinecken emphasised that in their interviews, they did not ask soldiers if they had problems with military leadership, but this was something that emerged across the ranks, from rifleman to colonel. They reported a “culture of neglect and their welfare” leading to the perception that their lives do not matter. Notably, in the SAMIDRC deployment, soldiers generally felt a lack of care, that they were abandoned, and did not have the needed support.
Leadership issues are compounded by a disconnect between commanders and troops on the ground, with leaders afraid to advocate for troops for fear of repercussions. Soldiers also criticised political, race, and gender-based appointments rather than those based on experience and merit. Furthermore, deploying a large number of young women with no operational experience was seen as problematic, especially on offensive operations, like the recent deployment to the DRC.
Recommendations
Olivier summarised several recommendations from interaction with SANDF members, including improving mission readiness training; modernising equipment; overhauling logistics and sustainment; ensuring casualty evacuation through air support; sharing ground level intelligence and information; isolating unreliable partners; reforming command and control; improving civil-military interaction/integration (particularly with NGOs and others operating in conflict areas); improving interoperability; and improving discipline and morale.
Heinecken concluded by saying, “We have damn good soldiers, but the SANDF faces systemic institutional challenges,” which is affecting not only trust in military leadership but also feelings of neglect by the government. “There’s a lack of capacity, not a lack of will,” she concluded.
* The research team comprised of Professor Lindy Heinecken (Principal Investigator), Professor Francois Vreÿ (Co-Principle Investigator), Professor Michelle Nel (Researcher), Professor Thomas Mandrup (Researcher), Dr Wilhelm Janse van Rensburg (Researcher), and Dr Laetitia Olivier (Researcher).
