
South Africa’s defence establishment is staring down a policy and funding crisis decades in the making. At a recent session of the Joint Standing Committee on Defence (JSCD), long-time defence policy expert Nick Sendall presented an extensive retrospective on the country’s foundational defence documents, most notably the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review. The hearing, chaired by Malusi Gigaba, was underscored by warnings of budgetary collapse and institutional decay.
The 1996 vision
Sendall, a key drafter of the original policy documents, described how the 1996 White Paper and the 1998 Defence Review were created as “brother and sister” documents, developed to shift South Africa from a Cold War posture to a rights-based, peace-oriented military framework. These were informed by constitutional principles, international law, and the idea of a “core force”, a defence structure that could be scaled based on strategic need.
But even as they were being finalised, the policy was being undermined. According to Sendall, defence spending was already being cut as early as 1998, and the military was “not able to afford the force design” laid out in the Review.
The intent was to provide a streamlined force capable of engaging in both national defence and peacekeeping, supported by a strong reserve component. However, Sendall noted that successive governments failed to balance ambitions with fiscal discipline. As a result, the “core force” became less of a foundation and more of a limitation, leaving the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) underprepared for its obligations.
Institutional drift and defunding
Gigaba set the tone early in the meeting, referencing the “very grave concerns about the state of the SANDF, the defunding of the SANDF, [and] its capabilities to meet its constitutional requirements.”
He acknowledged the policy debate but warned that the situation had moved beyond theory: “This is part of an ongoing discussion [and] the final piece of the puzzle is the Journey to Greatness, which will indicate what’s the way forward not only in terms of policy and closing the gap between policy and capabilities but begin to indicate concretely what are the steps that are going to be taken going forward.”
Sendall, speaking to the long history of budget erosion, referred to the SANDF as suffering from “instability in meeting the force design and force structure and the maintenance of capabilities in defence” as early as the late 1990s. He described the post-2015 decline in funding as an acceleration of an already dangerous trend.
Gigaba and committee members expressed frustration that despite repeated warnings, there has been little meaningful response from the executive. Budget after budget has chipped away at the Defence Force’s operational readiness, with the SANDF now operating on a level below 1% of GDP. For a country facing rising transnational threats, including cyber warfare, regional instability, and climate-induced migration, such underinvestment could be catastrophic.
Delays, absences, and a missing strategy
A major source of frustration for the committee was the last-minute withdrawal of the “Journey to Greatness” strategy document from the agenda. Gigaba relayed the Minister’s explanation that the strategy had not yet passed through Cabinet approval, but Carl Niehaus, representing the Economic Freedom Fighters, voiced outrage, stating: “I want to register my deep concern that we are not getting this report today [which] is absolutely critical for us to understand where we are supposed to go.”
The frustration over delays was amplified by the Minister’s early departure from the meeting. Members noted a pattern of disengagement, with some suggesting that the executive branch is no longer fully engaged in the national defence discussion.
While Gigaba diplomatically acknowledged the Minister’s other obligations, he was clear that the stakes had never been higher: without a comprehensive strategy, Parliament is being asked to evaluate defence readiness and allocate budgets in a vacuum. Several members stressed that without clarity on the long-term direction, any further financial planning would be little more than political guesswork.
Integration controversies and historical trade-offs
Sendall also addressed the political compromises that shaped the early policy process. He explained that the integration of statutory and non-statutory forces, while historic, was also deeply contentious. In his words: “Yes, we had to make difficult trade-offs, and yes, the framework used for integration did favour certain structures. But that was the political price of a peaceful transition.”
This acknowledgement opened a brief but important conversation on equity and legacy. Critics from within the committee raised concerns that the structure of the SANDF continues to reflect apartheid-era hierarchies and underrepresents members from liberation forces like Umkhonto we Sizwe. However, since 1998, almost all SANDF branches have been led by former MK veterans.
Gigaba, responding to this critique, stated: “We cannot deny that the integration process was uneven. But we must not weaponise history to obscure the immediate challenge.”
That challenge, Gigaba noted, is to stabilise the SANDF, ensure its constitutional role is fulfilled, and chart a sustainable path forward that honours both history and current national needs.
Confronting the core problem
Throughout his presentation, Sendall repeatedly returned to the unresolved tension at the heart of South African defence policy: the mismatch between constitutional mandates and available funding. He described the SANDF’s structural state as a “static, shrinking structure” and explained that post-2015 efforts to implement the Defence Review were ultimately derailed when Treasury declined to fund the recovery plan.
The concept of the “core force,” once envisioned as a springboard for responsive military capability, now appears to represent the upper limit of what South Africa’s defence apparatus can manage. With ongoing budget constraints, the force has lost critical momentum and key capabilities, including mobility, strategic command capacity, and technological modernisation.
As Gigaba bluntly concluded: “Every year of delay puts more strain on our men and women in uniform. If Parliament does not act, if the Cabinet does not decide, then history will remember us as the ones who let the SANDF die not by bullet, but by budget.”
The 1996 White Paper envisioned a modern, accountable, and professional defence force grounded in democratic values. Nearly three decades later, that vision is still formally in place, but in practice, it is underfunded, understaffed, and under strain. The policy documents still exist, but their influence is waning amid institutional malaise and executive detachment.
The JSCD hearing laid bare the country’s defence conundrum. It is not simply a matter of revising strategy, but of mustering the political courage to make defence a national priority. Without urgent intervention, across policy, funding, and oversight, South Africa risks losing not just its military capability, but the very democratic control over defence that the 1996 White Paper so proudly enshrined.
The hearing ultimately provided clarity, not because it resolved these issues, but because it showed exactly where the roadblocks lie. Now, the challenge is no longer analysis, but action. Parliament and the executive must together answer the question: what level of defence do we need, and what are we willing to invest to make that a reality?