The Democratic Alliance (DA) has rejected the South African National Defence Force’s (SANDF’s) claim that its deployment with the SAMIDRC mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was a success. This follows the death of 14 South African soldiers at the hands of M23 rebels in late January and the subsequent termination of the mission’s mandate.
The Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Angie Motshekga, is on Friday expected to brief Parliament on the withdrawal of troops and equipment from the South African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (SAMIDRC), which had its mandate end on 13 March. Nicholas Gotsell, DA NCOP Member on Security & Justice, said his party will use this opportunity to ask pointed questions about the SANDF’s misleading public claims.
“The death of 14 South African soldiers and a further 174 injured in battle – brave men and women sent into an unstable conflict zone without air support, adequate equipment, or a coherent operational mandate – is not a success story. It is a national tragedy. Their blood is on Minister Motshekga’s hands. Whilst the returning troops make their way back to South Africa, the Minister continues to spin political fairy tales instead of reckoning with the facts,” Gotsell said.
On Sunday, Motshekga and SANDF Chief, General Rudzani Maphwanya, said the SAMIDRC mission – made up primarily of South African troops with contributions from Tanzania and Malawi – was a success in that it contributed to peace efforts in the Central African nation. However, Goma, Sake and other towns in North and South Kivu provinces remain under rebel control, and fighting continues in spite of peace talks.
African Defence Review Director Darren Olivier said “It’s absolutely correct to dispute the claims of ‘success’ and demand accountability” regarding SAMIDRC. He made it clear that “I consider it a failure, with a mandate to back up FARDC [DRC government] forces that was undermined by insufficient numbers, no air and other support, poor base locations, and the lack of a plan B.”
“But we need to be clear on what was actually feasible given what was deployed. SAMIDRC, and the SANDF, were never in a position to single-handedly prevent M23 and Rwanda Defence Force troops from overrunning Sake and Goma if FARDC resistance faltered. That would’ve required a much larger force.
“Similarly, several MONUSCO units including South Africans fought hard to try to head off the M23 assault under Operation Springbok III, losing several peacekeepers in the process. But MONUSCO stopped fighting and negotiated a ceasefire once FARDC resistance crumbled, as SAMIDRC did.”
Olivier concluded by saying he thinks it is good that members of parliament are engaging more thoroughly with SAMIDRC, its failures, and the impact on the SANDF, “and I hope this results in serious reform and additional funding for the SANDF as a result.”
