The South African Police Service (SAPS) is piloting 100 body-worn cameras (BWCs) this year. While some advocate for an accelerated, full-scale rollout, starting small allows the police to test assumptions, adapt processes and learn what works before making a long-term investment.
The rollout comes with a significant price tag. The SAPS estimates R14.4 million over five years, although the true cost will be far higher once the infrastructure for data storage and security, maintenance, repairs, officer training and supervisory capacity are factored in.
There are also non-monetary costs, particularly the impact on the right to privacy. BWCs introduce a new layer of surveillance, and the purpose behind their use must be clearly defined from the outset.
If the pilot is intended to assess whether BWCs are suitable for the South African context, the SAPS must first be clear about what problems they are trying to solve and what success would look like.
The past decade’s rapid expansion in BWC use worldwide has generated a lot of research on their impact on a range of outcomes, with widely varying results. The most comprehensive and reliable conclusions come from meta-reviews, which pool together and analyse the results of many studies.
Globally, one of the most common motivations for introducing BWCs has been to reduce police use of force. The theory is that both police officers and members of the public are more likely to behave appropriately when they know they are being recorded. Some studies support this claim, while others show no effect, and the overall evidence has become less conclusive over time.
What matters most is not simply whether officers wear cameras, but when and how they are activated, what training and supervision accompanies their use, and the broader culture within which they operate. In South Africa for example, BWCs are unlikely to make a significant dent in the kinds of incidents that led to the 460 deaths from police action recorded by the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) in 2024.
These cases often occur in high-stakes, fast-moving environments, where the presence of cameras alone is unlikely to alter behaviour in the moment. That is especially true in the absence of strong command oversight, consistent accountability and a well-established culture of restraint.
Officer safety is also a motivation for police using BWCs. This is particularly relevant in South Africa, where dozens of officers are killed in the line of duty every year. While it is plausible that BWCs could deter aggression and assist in prosecuting offenders, international research has not produced strong evidence to support this claim.
The most substantial evidence in favour of BWCs relates to reducing complaints against police. Whether this is due to improved officer behaviour, fewer frivolous complaints or both, the result is fairly consistent. BWCs could provide objective evidence to help resolve disputes fairly and quickly. They may also reduce the burden of civil claims, potentially saving significant resources.
Even a modest reduction in complaints and misconduct could help contain the over R2 billion in civil claims currently faced by the SAPS. For that reason, the pilot should prioritise deployment in areas with a high concentration of civil claims, where the potential for both accountability gains and cost savings is greatest.
There are other possible benefits. BWCs may strengthen evidence for court proceedings, leading to better case outcomes or shorter trials, and significant savings across the prosecution process. They could also improve post-incident debriefing and training, help identify successes and failures, and ultimately enhance policing practices.
But these benefits require supporting systems. Without adequate capacity for supervision, training and review, BWCs risk becoming just another piece of technology that does little to change behaviour or improve service.
Because of this, the SAPS pilot should be designed to test not only whether BWCs work in theory, but whether police are ready to support them in practice. This includes technical readiness: secure and scalable systems must be in place for storing, protecting and accessing footage.
Data must be reliably backed up, safeguarded under the Protection of Personal Information Act, and governed by clear protocols around retention and access. Mishandled footage could seriously undermine public confidence. At the same time, oversight mechanisms such as IPID must be guaranteed timely and full access when footage is needed for investigations.
International evidence also makes clear that results depend heavily on how cameras are used and managed in different institutional and community contexts. Most BWC research has been conducted in the United States and United Kingdom. South Africa differs significantly in terms of violent crime rates, infrastructure constraints and levels of public trust in the police.
So on the one hand, we should not assume that benefits observed elsewhere will automatically apply here. On the other, new and unexpected advantages may emerge. The pilot should be treated as a chance to generate South African evidence that can inform whether a national rollout is appropriate, and what conditions would be needed for success.
In the end, BWCs are not a shortcut to accountability, nor are they the SAPS’ most urgent reform priority. But given the investment, it is vital that the cameras be used in a way that drives broader improvements in training, supervision and performance, underpinned by a clear institutional commitment to transparency.
With the right planning, support systems and rigorous evaluation mechanisms, this pilot is a rare opportunity to learn what works in our context. It could shape policy and demonstrate leadership in building a more accountable police service.
Written by Anine Kriegler, Senior Researcher, Justice and Violence Prevention, ISS Pretoria.
Republished with permission from ISS Africa. The original article can be found here.
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