Carnegie reports that on August 9, 2024, a Long March 6A rocket blasted off from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi, northern China. The rocket carried eighteen Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites from the government-backed Qianfan company. State media hailed the launch as China’s answer to Starlink, the US-based satellite internet pioneer, and the first step toward challenging America’s dominance in this market. Qianfan intends to grow its constellation to more than 600 satellites by the end of 2025, and to eventually place some 14,000 satellites in orbit.
Qianfan isn’t the only Chinese company with satellite internet ambitions. Several other Chinese enterprises are also racing to launch their own mega-constellations. The Guowang Project, for example, run by the state-owned China Satellite Network Group, has announced plans to create a constellation of some 13,000 satellites – although it has yet to send any into space. Overall, China’s leaders hope to launch around 40,000 LEO satellites over the coming decade.
China and Africa
China’s involvement in Africa has significantly reshaped the continent’s economic, political and social landscapes over the last two decades. The tangible impacts have been multifaceted, encompassing substantial investments, infrastructure development, trade expansion and evolving geopolitical dynamics.
China has financed and constructed numerous large-scale infrastructure projects in multiple African nations, including roads, railways, port facilities and airports. Notable examples include the Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway in Ethiopia and Djibouti and the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya. China has become Africa’s largest trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding ¥1.4 trillion (US$200 billion) annually. African exports to China primarily consist of natural resources like oil and minerals, and agricultural products. Imports typically consist of manufactured goods and machinery. Chinese investments span sectors as diverse as mining, energy, telecommunications and manufacturing. The breadth and depth of these investments is accelerating economic growth and industrialisation in several African countries.
The China-Africa relationship extends into the political landscape, with China having established strong diplomatic ties with most African nations, often emphasising non-interference in domestic affairs and mutual respect for sovereignty. Platforms like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) facilitate dialogue, cooperation and strategic partnerships between China and African states.
This extends to technological and industrial collaboration with firms like Huawei and ZTE playing pivotal roles in expanding Africa’s telecommunications infrastructure, including the rollout of 5G networks. Furthermore, China continues to invest in setting up industrial parks and manufacturing hubs, promoting local production and economic diversification.
China and the African LEO industry – potential scenarios
With the continued commitment from Beijing and a long-term focus, the Chinese LEO industry will continue to grow and will reach the necessary scale and momentum to compete with Starlink, Eutelsat OneWeb and Amazon’s Project Kuiper.
The Honghu company is building a satellite manufacturing facility in Wuxi City, close to Shanghai in Jiangsu Province. This will reportedly have a capacity of 10,000 satellites per year. Honghu has already filed a constellation plan which would make it the third 10,000-plus satellite mega-constellation planned by Chinese entities. It follows the national Guowang plan and the Shanghai-backed proposal, both of which have been approved by China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Once these Chinese LEO operators are active above the African continent, the business and industry landscapes could look very different. Other operators tend to have a more short-term outlook, with an emphasis on strategies that prioritise profits and shareholder returns. While these business models are supported by brand dominance and direct-to-market models, China is known for longer-term, more collaborative strategies that enable rather than compete. This could ultimately lead to a situation where African telcos and service providers find more support and collaboration from China as opposed to having to compete with, or even being marginalised by other LEO operators.
Conclusion
China has made a significant entry into the global LEO industry, and is set to become a major force in this sector, including providing services over Africa. Factor in already-strong Sino–African relationships, and the bias of the African political arena towards Beijing, an even greater degree of collaboration can be expected in the LEO industry.
This development could prove to be a positive one for African telcos and service providers who may well find Chinese operators a better fit than competing counterparts which are developing alternative, direct-to-market models.
