Almost a year since deployment, prospects of success look bleak for the Southern African Development Community Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC). Even with its direct, offensive mandate, the mission may face the same fate as former operations in the east DRC.
Since 1999, the United Nations Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), East African Community Regional Force and the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) have tried unsuccessfully to restore peace.
Instead, in MONUSCO’s case, their efforts are known for human rights violations and failures to address local concerns in an area plagued by over 120 violent militia groups. These include the M23 rebel group, which has gained power in eastern DRC since 2012. A UN report in July showed the group was supported by Rwandan and Ugandan troops – a claim that both countries deny.
In May 2023, SADC authorised SAMIDRC to stabilise the region, giving it an offensive mandate to engage in direct combat with armed groups. The mission’s target strength was 5 000 troops from Malawi, South Africa and Tanzania, but only 1 300 have been deployed.
SAMIDRC’s financing arrangement reveals both the ambition and constraints of regional peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. The mission’s annual costs were estimated at US$500 million, with South Africa committing US$100 million and the DRC US$200 million. While this shows regional ownership, the considerable funding gap makes success difficult.
To support SAMIDRC, the United Nations Security Council authorised a partnership with MONUSCO on operations, intelligence sharing and technical collaboration. SAMIDRC can use MONUSCO’s well-established infrastructure, including vital logistical and military capabilities, notably air assets that enable medical evacuations.
Despite this support, SAMIDRC – like previous missions – has made insufficient progress in stabilising the region.
SAMIDRC’s rules of engagement provide the necessary balance between offensive and defensive actions, and civilian protection. However, funding shortfalls and the lack of troops and equipment hinder operations, as happened with MONUSCO and the East African force. As a result, SAMIDRC struggles to identify and respond to immediate threats (with armed groups integrating into civilian areas) and reclaim territory.
In contrast, M23 has gained control of strategic locations such as Masisi and Rutshuru, displacing many civilians in the process. Rebel groups have also carried out gross human rights violations including murder, sexual violence and pillaging, with women and children most affected.
The violent conflict displaced over two million people within the country in the first half of 2024 alone, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reports. According to Human Rights Watch, Rwandan forces fighting alongside M23 have ‘indiscriminately shelled displacement camps’ around Goma throughout 2024. These dire violations include over 1 800 children being recruited by rebel groups in the past year.
Concerns over SAMIDRC’s capabilities are compounded by questions about its legitimacy. SADC has been called ‘reckless’ for deploying troops in the face of deep capacity challenges. Although accurate figures are hard to find, the mission has already cost the lives of over 15 soldiers with more captured by M23 rebels this year.
Rwanda opposed the lack of consultation in the force’s deployment. It asked the African Union to withhold its backing for SAMIDRC, arguing that its presence would escalate tensions in the conflict.
At a September workshop hosted by the Institute for Security Studies, local civil society groups and communities in east DRC also questioned SAMIDRC’s ability to manage the conflict’s complex dynamics.
‘For the people of Goma, there is also the problem of the multiplicity of all these regional forces deployed on Congolese soil,’ said one workshop participant. ‘People are wondering how many more foreign armies will be present in the country. This discredits the trust in the … FARDC. Many reject the increased presence of foreign armies.’
Allegations of sexual misconduct also erode the mission’s credibility. Recent reports suggest SAMIDRC personnel have impregnated local women, with claims that soldiers have paid ‘divorce fees’ to avoid being sued or sanctioned. These reports follow a history of sexual exploitation and misconduct by peacekeeping forces in the country, and show that security has not been linked with sustainable humanitarian and development initiatives.
The conflict reflects a complex web of competing interests over the country’s resources, involving an array of armed groups, and national and regional players. This makes SAMIDRC’s task challenging, as it did with MONUSCO and other missions.
In SAMIDRC’s case, SADC member states have failed to ensure the force’s full deployment and address its structural challenges. MONUSCO’s support isn’t enough to compensate for insufficient finances, infrastructure and personnel – without which the force has little chance of success against well-armed rebel groups and Rwandan troops.
To remedy some of these issues, SAMIDRC has deployed a Mission Training Team to ensure the interoperability of forces during joint operations with the DRC army. While SAMIDRC serves as a coordination hub, success hinges on all actors working with MONUSCO, local communities and civil society organisations.
Without urgently addressing its problems, SAMIDRC will likely join the list of failed interventions in east DRC. The force must be boosted to its full target strength, and SADC and its member countries must ensure adequate resourcing, equipment and training. This will require dialogue and re-mobilising support for the mission.
It is also worth considering whether SAMIDRC’s mandate should include humanitarian, development and peacebuilding efforts.
On the ground, SAMIDRC’s leaders need to ensure compliance with justice and accountability mechanisms relating to misconduct and sexual exploitation of vulnerable groups. The mission should engage with local governments, civil society actors and communities to understand their concerns while fostering cooperation.
Written by Nirvaly Mooloo, Consultant Research Officer, ISS, and Remadji Hoinathy, Senior Researcher, Central Africa and Lake Chad Basin, ISS.
Republished with permission from ISS Africa. The original article can be found here.
