The full results are expected to take another week to finalize and there have been allegations of electoral fraud and threats of a nationwide protest by opposition candidates. But in the vote count from Mozambique’s Oct. 9 general election, Daniel Chapo leads, and Reuters writes he is “widely expected to win.” With outgoing President Filipe Nyusi stepping down at the end of his two terms in office, Chapo—a 47-year-old lawyer—could signify a change in the guard from past leaders who participated in the liberation struggle of the 1960s and ’70s. Mozambique is in a tense situation, though, mired in debt and wounded by an insurgency spawned by Islamist militants. And if Chapo does not quickly develop a strategy for ending that protracted, volatile conflict, a security vacuum may emerge in the country’s resource-rich north.
Precipitating Mozambique’s economic turmoil was the “tuna bond” scandal. From 2013 to 2016, illegal loans were secretly given to state enterprises developing fishing and maritime security projects. In total, more than $100 million was spent on bribes during President Armando Guebuza’s tenure. Nearly a decade since the hidden loans were discovered, Mozambique has been struggling to repay those and other borrowing which raised the levels of public debt. The economic situation has hit hardest those living in the underdeveloped, restive northern provinces, where terrorist cells have recruited impoverished and unemployed youth.
The full results are expected to take another week to finalize and there have been allegations of electoral fraud and threats of a nationwide protest by opposition candidates. But in the vote count from Mozambique’s Oct. 9 general election, Daniel Chapo leads, and Reuters writes he is “widely expected to win.” With outgoing President Filipe Nyusi stepping down at the end of his two terms in office, Chapo—a 47-year-old lawyer—could signify a change in the guard from past leaders who participated in the liberation struggle of the 1960s and ’70s. Mozambique is in a tense situation, though, mired in debt and wounded by an insurgency spawned by Islamist militants. And if Chapo does not quickly develop a strategy for ending that protracted, volatile conflict, a security vacuum may emerge in the country’s resource-rich north.
Precipitating Mozambique’s economic turmoil was the “tuna bond” scandal. From 2013 to 2016, illegal loans were secretly given to state enterprises developing fishing and maritime security projects. In total, more than $100 million was spent on bribes during President Armando Guebuza’s tenure. Nearly a decade since the hidden loans were discovered, Mozambique has been struggling to repay those and other borrowing which raised the levels of public debt. The economic situation has hit hardest those living in the underdeveloped, restive northern provinces, where terrorist cells have recruited impoverished and unemployed youth.
In Cabo Delgado province, more than 4,000 people have been killed and over 800,000 displaced since a campaign of terror began in 2017. In response to a regional military mission stationed there, insurgents from Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaah, which became a branch of the Islamic State in 2022—also known as Islamic State-Mozambique, or IS-M—have been changing their strategy.
IS-M terrorists are now spreading into different areas of the province and operating cells in other northern provinces. In Macomia, a rural district 1,500 miles north of the capital, Maputo—itself the site of a number of attacks this year—improvised explosive devices have been planted along the roads. Sustained attacks prevented some people in the district from registering to vote for the October election. The administrative functions of Macomia have also been compromised because of a five-month closure of the district office and health centers as well as the temporary closure of schools.
Chapo ran a campaign promising that a vote for him was a vote for peace. He has put forth a two-pronged strategy in dealing with the conflict, involving more boots on the ground and dialogue with the rebels. Rui Mate, a researcher with the Maputo-based Public Integrity Center, is skeptical, pointing out that the old guard of Chapo’s party, Frelimo, which has ruled since independence in 1975, has consistently downplayed the situation.
“Chapo will have to a wage a very big internal struggle to reverse the situation,” Mate said. The researcher also questioned the effectiveness of Chapo’s plan. “Since the beginning of the insurgency, there has never been an inquiry into the reasons for discontent and not even a face-to-face dialogue with anyone about their grievances, so there are questions about what Chapo can actually do.”
The outgoing president, Nyusi, developed a security-driven response aimed at containing terrorism but which failed to address social inequality and poverty, said analyst Borges Nhamirre of the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, South Africa. Nhamirre said he thought it was likely Chapo—a relative newcomer to politics who entered government in 2009 as a district administrator—would follow in his predecessor’s footsteps.
“With little relevant government experience or people he trusts to work with, Chapo’s first cabinet will probably comprise Nyusi’s recommendations and initially continue Nyusi’s approach to the insurgency,” he said.
Nyusi’s aim of restoring order in Cabo Delgado focused on protecting high-value resources, including Africa’s largest natural gas projects. After the Russian paramilitary Wagner Group failed to defeat the rebels, the strategic town of Palma was overrun by insurgents in 2021, so Nyusi turned to Rwanda for assistance. The presence of the Rwandan mission has stabilized much of Cabo Delgado’s Afungi Peninsula. There, minimal construction work has resumed on a once suspended $20 billion liquefied natural gas project run by the French oil company TotalEnergies.
TotalEnergies CEO Patrick Pouyanné has expressed his wish for the security arrangement to continue ahead of a working visit to Maputo with Mozambique’s new leader at the end of October. The Rwandan forces also have a base in Ancuabe district, which is rich in rubies and graphite, used in electric car batteries. Mining had been suspended due to insecurity in 2022, but project investment has increased as the Rwandans continue to hold fort.
Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s forces are in Mozambique through a bilateral agreement signed with Nyusi, but the terms are confidential, raising suspicion about Rwanda’s true motive for stabilizing the region. On several occasions, the Rwandans have gone beyond Cabo Delgado to patrol Nampula province. Analysts say Mozambique needs to develop a clear mandate for the Rwandan army, including a timeline.
Fighting alongside Rwandan soldiers in the north since 2021 is the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission in Mozambique—known as SAMIM—composed of more than 3,000 troops from member states of the regional SADC bloc. Part of the multicountry mission pulled out this year due to funding constraints and limited military equipment, and the majority of the South African contingent is expected to withdraw in December. A recent report by the International Crisis Group warned that the departure of SAMIM could enable the Islamic State to gain more ground.
For now, Mozambique has assurance from bloc member Tanzania that its forces will remain active, as areas along their shared border are frequently attacked and there are Tanzanian members of IS-M. According to Nyusi, the current leader of IS-M is a Tanzanian national—Abu Zainabo, known as “Ulanga.”
The fight against jihadis moving in and out of Cabo Delgado will prove challenging for the remaining SAMIM, Tanzanian, and Rwandan legions. Not only do they have a limited mandate, but the main stakeholder, the Mozambican army, is an inadequate force.
On several occasions, Mozambican soldiers have reportedly fled sites even after SAMIM or the Rwandans have handed back control. The national defense forces are poorly paid and sometimes lack basic equipment such as boots, helmets, and vehicles. The European Union has supported training and provided equipment, but the army still lacks technically skilled staff and special forces.
Beyond training deficiencies, there is a dark side to the Cabo Delgado conflict that could tarnish Chapo as incoming president if it goes unaddressed. Mozambican forces have long been implicated in human rights abuses toward civilians, including arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings, and sexual assault, but the government has not held them to account.
“The elected president of Mozambique should immediately set up an independent commission of inquiry to investigate the widespread rights violations by both state security forces and the insurgents,” said Zenaida Machado, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch’s Africa division. “Those implicated in abuses over the past eight years of the Cabo Delgado conflict should be prosecuted in fair trials.”
The incoming administration must also provide reparations for victims as well as psychosocial support to women and girls who have suffered a range of sexual and physical abuses, Machado said.
Across Mozambique, tens of thousands of people have lost families and livelihoods to violence in different forms. This election held the hope of a break from the failures of weak state institutions in mitigating violence and radicalization. But while Maputo prepares for a changeover, the prospects of a definitive change in the approach to the security situation in Cabo Delgado could take time, exposing vulnerable communities to violence and sowing still more seeds of discontent.
