The United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) decided in December 2024 to replace the current AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with a smaller force, the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
Since then, discussions have focused mainly on Egypt and Ethiopia’s contributions to AUSSOM. Their possible deployment intersects with geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa – including over access to water and the Red Sea. In contrast, relatively little has been said about Burundi’s potential withdrawal of its soldiers from Somalia over a dispute about troop numbers.
Burundi had suggested contributing 3 000 of AUSSOM’s 12 626 soldiers, but then said it would not participate after Somalia indicated it would accept only 1 000. A letter from Somalia’s defence minister to his Burundian counterpart confirmed the possible Burundian exit, citing a lack of consensus on troop numbers.
Senior Burundian officials said the allocated number was insufficient and would leave soldiers fighting al-Shabaab exposed. Despite these concerns, Burundian participation is reportedly still unclear as discussions continue.
Burundi’s non-participation would be significant for AUSSOM. The country – one of the largest contributors to AU missions in Somalia – has played an important role in several successes, including Mogadishu’s liberation in 2011 and the capture and protection of other strategic locations.
A withdrawal would also impact Burundi. For 18 years, the country contributed to Somalia’s first AU mission (AMISOM), and was the second nation after Uganda to send soldiers in 2007. By the end of 2008, Burundi had deployed some 1 700 troops to Somalia. Its contingent expanded as AMISOM grew in response to the al-Shabaab insurgency, peaking at around 5 500 – more than a fifth of its total army.
The motivation for sending so many troops to a volatile Somalia was partly linked to domestic developments in Burundi. AMISOM deployments created a steady income source, which helped integrate former belligerents and professionalise the army formed after the Burundian civil war ended in 2005. The country’s defence budget was largely financed through AMISOM participation and associated security assistance.
This was initially seen as a good example of how peacekeeping can bolster post-war reconstruction. But that changed when a political crisis engulfed Burundi in 2015 over then-president Pierre Nkurunziza’s decision to run for a third term. Public protests erupted, and security forces responded violently, causing the death of several hundred people. A failed military coup in May 2015 aggravated the situation.
As funding sources dried up in response to state repression, AMISOM participation became an increasingly important financial lifeline for Burundi’s government, which needed the revenue to pay its troops. Engaging in peacekeeping abroad had become vital to keeping peace at home.
AMISOM also provided some political cover for Burundi. It made the AU and other actors reluctant to intervene directly in the country, despite AU threats to get involved in de-escalating violence in Burundi.
When ATMIS replaced AMISOM in 2022, Burundi looked for peacekeeping opportunities elsewhere, with little success. Efforts to deploy its troops to peace support missions in the Central African Republic, Haiti and Sudan did not materialise.
Burundi did contribute a contingent to eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as part of the East African Community Regional Force in 2023, but that operation ended prematurely because of Kinshasa’s frustration with its perceived inaction.
As it withdrew forces from Somalia during the winding up of ATMIS, Burundi expanded its military presence in the DRC under a bilateral arrangement. A joint military operation agreed in July 2022 initially targeted Burundian armed opposition groups in eastern DRC.
In 2023, Burundi sent hundreds of soldiers to fight the M23 rebellion in North Kivu alongside the Congolese army and allied local armed groups. Burundi’s military presence in the DRC comprises at least two brigades of several thousand soldiers altogether.
Deploying in the DRC posed several challenges for Burundi. Some soldiers were reluctant to participate because of high casualties, low pay and limited support. In June 2024, a military court in Burundi sentenced over 270 soldiers to lengthy jail terms for refusing to fight M23.
Burundi’s strategic alignment with the DRC also contributed to a deterioration of Burundi’s relations with neighbouring Rwanda. Tensions between the DRC and Rwanda over the latter’s support for M23 have put the two countries at risk of war.
An exit from Somalia would be a watershed moment in the country’s post-war history, with important domestic repercussions. Burundi still depends on the AU mission as one of its main sources of much-needed foreign exchange.
Without these funds, worsening living conditions would damage its army and prospects for military career advancement, which largely rely on peacekeeping participation. It is uncertain whether Burundi’s DRC deployments can provide a sustainable alternative to the loss of peacekeeping allowances and associated material and training benefits.
These financial consequences and soldiers’ existing frustrations over the circumstances of operations in the DRC, could breed internal discontent in the army, weakening its response to Burundi’s volatile domestic and regional security situation.
The gradual substitution of multilateral peacekeeping participation, like in Somalia, with bilateral deployments also weakens the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement that ended Burundi’s civil war. The accord brought the military under civilian democratic control – but current bilateral deployments are based on opaque decision making and lack parliamentary oversight. This undermines the increasingly fragile foundations of a post-war Burundi.
Written by Bram Verelst, Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention, Management and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region, ISS Nairobi.
Republished with permission from ISS Africa. The original article can be found here.
