In three years, the Rwandan contingent in Mozambique has grown dramatically and expanded its operations across five districts.
In July 2021, around 1 000 personnel from the Rwanda Defence Force and Rwanda National Police arrived in the terrorist-hit Mozambique province of Cabo Delgado. The province faced a severe threat from violent extremism characterised by increased attacks on civilians and public infrastructure.
The Rwandan mission’s official objective was to help restore Mozambican state authority by conducting combat and security operations and security sector reform, as well as stabilising the province.
Notably, the Rwandan troops were first deployed in two districts, Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, home to liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects worth billions of dollars. The projects are led by Western multinational companies, notably TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil and Eni.
These enterprises are key for Mozambique’s economic development, and were threatened by the terrorist attacks. Deploying the Rwandan forces to these areas created the impression that their purpose was to protect these vital economic assets rather than meet the official mission objectives.
At the same time, the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) was also deployed to Cabo Delgado, but to areas further from the gas projects. SAMIM aimed to support Mozambique in combatting terrorism and acts of violent extremism, and it seemed to have the primary role of protecting the local population and restoring security.
Although deployed in the same province, there was no proper coordination or sharing of strategic information between the Rwandan, SAMIM and host country forces, which resulted in several friendly fire incidents. SAMIM’s mandate in Cabo Delgado ended in mid-2024.
The bilateral agreement to deploy Rwandan troops in Mozambique was, and remains, secret. It is known only to the two countries’ top leadership and was never submitted to the Mozambique Parliament. This led to contestation, especially by Mozambique’s defence and security sector watchdogs such as the parliamentary opposition, the media and civil society organisations.
Three years after their deployment to Cabo Delgado, the Rwandan troops undoubtedly succeeded on the battlefield. They have reduced the insurgents’ firepower, dislodged them from their main bases, and restored stability around the LNG projects. Yet their capacity and inclination for hot pursuit have displaced the problem, with terror groups dispersing and regrouping in other locations.
At the end of 2023, in somewhat triumphalist speeches, Mozambican military commanders claimed that with the help of Rwandan forces, security had been re-established in roughly 90% of Cabo Delgado. This claim was amplified by academic and media articles that praised Rwanda’s effective and successful offensive strategy that ‘degraded the capability of the jihadist insurgents terrorising northern Mozambique.’
However, this was an exaggeration. Although weakened, the terrorist threat is far from over. On the contrary, insurgents have demonstrated an ability to adapt to the new and evolving security context, and are increasingly using improvised explosive devices.
Realising they have lost ground, the insurgents’ strategy has evolved from attacking civilians to ‘winning hearts and minds’ – a new development for Cabo Delgado but one used by other extremists in Africa, like Boko Haram in Nigeria.
Also, narratives on the success of the Rwandan troops don’t cover all the mission’s stated objectives. For instance, commentators are silent on the aim of ‘supporting efforts to restore Mozambican state authority and security-sector reform.’ Research reveals that for all the work of the Rwandan forces in Cabo Delgado, very little has been achieved regarding the restoration of the Mozambican state.
Indeed, government authority in Cabo Delgado remains fragile, and security sector reform is still only an aspiration, with Mozambican forces operating under poor standards of professionalism.
This has led security analysts to question the long-term strategy of Rwandan forces in Cabo Delgado. ‘Today Mozambique is vulnerable to Rwandan power,’ says Calton Cadeado, a Mozambican security studies expert and researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Joaquim Chissano University in Maputo. ‘It happens because Rwanda has a privileged space in Mozambique’s security infrastructure and even in the economic projects of gas exploration.’
Cadeado says there are suspicions that Rwandan forces could adopt a more lax stance to their operations, especially since SAMIM’s withdrawal. This could worsen the security situation, ultimately making the Rwandan troops more necessary for the safety of locals and businesses.
The media also reports that despite the good relations Rwandan forces have cultivated with some community members, others question their growing role in Cabo Delgado. For example, in Mocímboa da Praia, the population refused to use a market built by the Rwandan forces as part of their civil-military relations strategy.
The local media quote members of the community as saying the Rwandans ‘came to Mocímboa da Praia to provide support in the fight against terrorism, and when they start building infrastructure, it’s not clear what the real intention of those troops is.’
This scepticism is not unfounded. As time goes by, Rwandan security forces have become a presence in more and more districts in Cabo Delgado, conducting operations that Mozambican troops should perform. Moreover, three years after their deployment, there is still no clarity on when they will withdraw.
Instead, the number of Rwandan troops in Mozambique has risen from 1 000 to around 5 000. They have established positions in at least five districts in Cabo Delgado (Mocímboa da Praia, Palma, Ancuabe, Macomia and Quissanga). From there, the troops launch operations covering over half of Cabo Delgado’s 17 districts and parts of Nampula Province.
Both Mozambique and Rwanda should revisit the Rwandan mission’s objective in Cabo Delgado. They must ensure that while Rwandan troops support the host country’s counter-terrorism strategy, they don’t replace government security forces in their role as primary security guarantor. The latter would have long-term implications for state authority over Mozambique’s territory and its people.
Written by Borges Nhamirre, Consultant, ISS Pretoria. Republished with permission from ISS Africa. The original article can be found here.
