“We must stand firm on democracy. Without democracy, there is no governance, there is no freedom, there is no rule of law. We will not allow coup after coup in West Africa.”
“We must stand firm on democracy. Without democracy, there is no governance, there is no freedom, there is no rule of law. We will not allow coup after coup in West Africa.”
When Nigerian President Bola Tinubu made that statement in early July while accepting the chair of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), he did not expect to be immediately thrust into handling a crisis next door. On July 26, soldiers in Niger carried out a coup and removed democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum. Within hours, Tinubu issued a strongly worded statement denouncing the coup before sending Beninese President Patrice Talon as the bloc’s official mediator. The former Nigerian military head of state Abdulsalam Abubakar was later deployed to Niamey as part of a final mediation effort. After a confirmation that coup plotters had installed army Gen. Abdourahamane Tchiani as head of state, Tinubu called an emergency summit of ECOWAS leaders to discuss a response.
Western allies have praised Tinubu’s prompt actions. He has spoken to U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken as well as U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres and other actors in the region. This provides an opportunity for a president with the smallest mandate among elected presidents since the country’s return to democracy in 1999 with a chance to shore up his reputation. Unlike Nigeria’s increasingly powerful state governors, he actively leads on foreign policy. Given regional diplomacy’s impact on security and trade, it may help play a key role in how successful his presidency is.
Nigerian presidents have seldom been elected based on their foreign-policy campaigns or statements. Corruption and raging insecurity played a major role when Muhammadu Buhari defeated incumbent Goodluck Jonathan in 2015, and the 2023 elections were largely contested along ethnic identity lines. Even when most of the front-runners made the pilgrimage to Chatham House in London to present their ideas, there were few major foreign-policy announcements or indications of how they would engage.
And despite making appointments at a pace only comparable to former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999, Tinubu had not formally appointed a cabinet—or named a foreign minister or even designated a foreign affairs portfolio to any of his advisors—when this crisis started. The president could also struggle with balancing the responsibility of governing alongside the difficulty of corralling a ruling party that already has its eye on future elections.
During his speech accepting the ECOWAS chair, Tinubu concluded by stating that “I am with you. And Nigeria, we are back.” Such assertions are usually shared when political power changes parties, but since assuming office in late May, Tinubu has made a concerted effort to distance his administration from his predecessor’s, which was accused of moving slowly and being aloof.
Part of the challenge of dealing with the Nigerien situation is the precedent already established by the Buhari government and ECOWAS in dealing with previous coups in the region. The bluster of ECOWAS’s one-week ultimatums after previous coups was met by Burkina Faso and Mali with threats to respond and leave the bloc. Tinubu might use this situation to chart a new course for the organization and use it as the linchpin of his foreign-policy plans.
But this coup is different. Nigeria shares its largest border with Niger. Nigerian Vice-President Kashim Shettima was a two-term governor of Borno state, which borders Niger and is the epicenter of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Aside from the political expediency of the selection, the rising conflict in the region means that governors are interacting with counterparts in neighboring countries to address the impact on their states.
Another major question over Tinubu’s direction on Niger, and foreign policy in general, is if there will be any marked departures from convention. Abuja’s relationship with the European Union seems to have cooled in the aftermath of the release of the EU’s observer mission report on the 2023 presidential election, which opposition parties have seized upon to help aid them in challenging the result in court. It is also telling that the United States has not rushed to welcome his administration the way it did with his predecessor’s in 2015, especially given how his past dealings with U.S. law enforcement on different issues were scrutinized during the elections.
This may provide another dimension for the seemingly good relationship Tinubu has with France—as gleaned from Paris being his choice for medical visits, as opposed to London, which was the favored destination for Buhari. Nigeria and France have often been cited as rivals for preeminence in the region, with security operations and even influence over ECOWAS often a key theater of these contests. However, Tinubu appears to have a better relationship with Francophone West Africa, as evidenced by his business ties with former Guinean President Alpha Condé.
Handling Niger will also require deft management to ensure that country’s citizens can afford to trust Abuja’s involvement without it seeming like a placeholder for French or explicitly Western interests. This might run afoul of established partnerships with China, which has maintained a strong level of investment in Nigeria and might use this relationship to try to shore up a presence under an active Tinubu administration. It also brings the question on how Nigeria will engage with the Wagner Group and Russia, which are fast becoming power brokers in the region.
Working with such domestic and external partners will greatly help the other major pillar of Tinubu’s foreign-policy work: improved trade. When he assumed the ECOWAS chair, he promised an extraordinary summit on trade and investment in October, which could assuage concerns from external investors and neighboring countries that he would carry out actions harmful to the bloc’s policy on the free movement of goods.
In 2019, Buhari closed Nigeria’s borders with Benin to improve domestic food production, among other reasons, a policy that many are not sure yielded the desired result. A lot of emphasis has been placed on creating a welcoming environment for foreign investment, and seeking to maximize opportunities on trade would be key. However, all of this will likely be put on hold until the present crisis is resolved.
When Tinubu was named ECOWAS chair, his team flaunted it as something for Nigerians to be proud of. However, this role isn’t exactly novel for the country. All but three of Nigeria’s heads of state since the bloc’s formation have served as chair, and two of those three served for less than a year.
Regardless of whether it holds the chair or not, it was inevitable that all eyes would be on Nigeria in the wake of a coup next door and that the region and world would expect it to help curb this crisis. With the increasingly blurred lines between domestic and foreign affairs, looking good to the outside world could help keep Tinubu in his post amid the ongoing legal issues plaguing his election win.
While the proverb preaches that charity begins at home, for Tinubu it might be found abroad.
