The proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, has transformed modern warfare, extending its reach beyond traditional state actors to non-state entities such as insurgents and terrorist organizations.
In Africa, where conflicts involving violent extremist groups have escalated in recent decades, drones have emerged as a game-changing tool. Initially adopted by nation-states for surveillance and counter-terrorism, drones are now increasingly utilized by insurgents and terrorists for reconnaissance, propaganda, and even direct attacks.
We will examine how these groups in Africa have harnessed drone technology, supported by real-life instances, and explores the implications for security on the continent.
The Evolution of Drone Use in Conflict Zones
Drones, once the exclusive domain of advanced militaries, have become more accessible due to their affordability, ease of use, and availability on the commercial market. What began as a tool for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) has evolved into a weapon capable of delivering explosives or guiding attacks.
The Islamic State (IS) pioneered this shift in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2020, using modified commercial drones to drop munitions and conduct kamikaze-style assaults. This precedent has not been lost on African insurgent and terrorist groups, who are adapting similar tactics to their operational environments.
In Africa, the use of drones by non-state actors reflects a broader trend of technological democratization. Hobbyist drones, such as the DJI Phantom, can be purchased for as little as $450 and modified with minimal technical expertise. The availability of 3D printing technology further enables these groups to produce custom parts, while knowledge transfer from global jihadist networks accelerates their adoption of UAVs.
As a result, drones have leveled the playing field, giving resource-limited insurgents capabilities once reserved for well-funded militaries.
Real-Life Instances of Drone Use by Insurgents and Terrorists in Africa
- Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya
Al-Shabaab, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated group operating primarily in Somalia and parts of Kenya, has been one of the earliest adopters of drone technology among African terrorist organizations. The group has primarily used drones for ISR and propaganda purposes, though its capabilities are expanding.
Manda Bay Attack (January 2020): Al-Shabaab employed drones to coordinate an assault on the U.S. military base at Manda Bay, Kenya. The attack resulted in the deaths of one American soldier and two contractors, demonstrating the group’s ability to use UAVs to gather real-time intelligence and guide ground forces. U.S. officials confirmed Al-Shabaab’s “prolific use” of drones in this operation, a fact later noted by the United Nations Security Council.
Captured U.S. ScanEagle (September 2022): Al-Shabaab showcased its acquisition of a U.S.-made ScanEagle drone, likely seized from Somali or allied forces. While the group may lack the expertise to repurpose this military-grade UAV, the incident underscored its intent to integrate advanced technology into its arsenal. Propaganda photos released by the group highlighted this capture as a symbolic victory.
Ceel Dheer Interception (February 15, 2025): Somali National Army forces shot down two reconnaissance drones operated by Al-Shabaab in the Galgaduud region, indicating ongoing use of UAVs for surveillance. This incident reflects a pattern of drone deployment to monitor military positions and plan ambushes. - Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria
ISWAP, an offshoot of Boko Haram operating in the Lake Chad Basin, has embraced drones as a tool for both propaganda and battlefield advantage. The group has benefited from the technical know-how of IS fighters who migrated to Africa following the collapse of the caliphate in Syria.
Propaganda Video (January 2022): ISWAP released a video showcasing its training camp in northern Nigeria, filmed using a quadcopter drone. This bird’s-eye perspective served as a propaganda tool to project strength and sophistication to recruits and adversaries alike.
Gubio Ambush (July 2022): In Gubio, Nigeria, ISWAP deployed a surveillance drone to monitor a Nigerian military convoy before launching an ambush. The drone’s reconnaissance enabled precise targeting, highlighting its tactical utility. Reports indicate ISWAP is also experimenting with weaponizing drones, testing delivery systems for explosives in the Lake Chad Basin, though no confirmed attacks have occurred as of early 2025.
Captured Equipment: In September 2020, ISWAP claimed to have seized a DJI Phantom drone during an attack on Nigerian forces, illustrating how the group acquires technology through battlefield spoils. - Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in Mali and Burkina Faso
JNIM, an Al-Qaeda-aligned coalition active in the Sahel, has demonstrated growing sophistication in its use of drones, transitioning from passive surveillance to offensive capabilities.
Kidal Attack (November 9, 2024): During an assault in Kidal, Mali, JNIM reportedly seized a drone belonging to the Wagner Group or its successor, Africa Corps. While the group has not yet widely deployed drones offensively, this capture suggests an intent to study and potentially replicate such technology.
Djibo FPV Drone Strikes (February 2025): In Burkina Faso’s Djibo town, JNIM employed first-person view (FPV) drones to drop improvised explosive devices (IEDs) made from plastic bottles onto military positions. This marked a significant escalation, as FPV drones—small, agile, and often used in Ukraine—allow precise targeting. Analysts suggest JNIM acquired this technique through collaboration with Azawad rebels, who may have learned it from Ukrainian conflict zones.
Tessalit Attack (April 14, 2024): JNIM is suspected of using a weaponized drone to kill 10 members of the Drozo militia in Mali. Analysts noted the attack involved a crude release system for explosives, indicating the group’s nascent but evolving ability to adapt commercial drones for combat. - Islamic State in Mozambique (IS-Mozambique/ASWJ)
The Islamic State’s affiliate in Mozambique, locally known as Ahlu-Sunnah wal Ja’maa (ASWJ), has utilized drones to support its insurgency in Cabo Delgado province.
Mocimboa de Praia Attacks (May 2020): ASWJ used drones to identify targets during its assault on Mocimboa de Praia, enabling precise coordination of ground forces. This operation disrupted local security and solidified the group’s foothold in the region.
Palma Attack (March 2021): Drones were again deployed for ISR during the attack on Palma, which killed dozens and displaced thousands. Unverified reports from private security firms also suggest small drones were used offshore, possibly to monitor maritime movements.
Drone Shootdowns (2022–2023): Mozambican forces neutralized multiple ASWJ observation drones, with incidents reported in July 2022 and February 2023. These events highlight the group’s reliance on UAVs for intelligence-gathering, even as it faces countermeasures. - Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the Democratic Republic of Congo
The ADF, an IS-aligned group operating in eastern DRC, has begun integrating drones into its operations, likely with external support.
Target Location (Recent Years): Insurgents have used UAVs to pinpoint targets for attacks, as reported by regional security sources. In one instance, a man with ties to a Middle Eastern Islamist militia was detained while assisting the ADF with drone development, suggesting knowledge transfer from abroad. - Azawad Liberation Front (FLA): fighters from the Azawad Liberation Front have been spotted using advanced drone technology. A video circulating on social media showcases a fighter operating a VTOL (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) drone, marking a new chapter in the region’s warfare. Army general staff said the military had intercepted a “terrorist” drone after the FLA said the mainly Tuareg group’s fighters had “brought down a Malian army helicopter in Tessalit” in the country’s northeast.
- Rapid Support Force (RSF): The Sudanese Army recently announced via its official platforms that it had successfully intercepted and captured three CH-95 drones and six smaller drones, all armed with air-to-ground munitions. The Sudanese army says it has intercepted a landward transfer of three Chinese-made CH-95 drone, and six smaller (likely CH-92) armed drones with multiple air-to-ground munitions to the Rapid Support Force (RSF) from the UAE.
Drivers and Enablers of Drone Use
Several factors have facilitated the adoption of drones by African insurgents and terrorists:
Accessibility: Commercial drones are widely available and affordable, with models like the DJI Phantom easily modified for nefarious purposes. smuggling routes, already used for weapons and cellphones, facilitate their acquisition.
Knowledge Transfer: Global jihadist networks, such as IS and Al-Qaeda, share technical expertise with African affiliates. Fighters returning from Iraq and Syria have brought drone-related skills to the continent.
Battlefield Seizures: Groups like ISWAP and Al-Shabaab have captured military-grade drones from government forces, supplementing their commercial acquisitions.
Innovation: The use of 3D printing and open-source software allows these groups to customize drones, while collaboration with other conflict zones (e.g., Ukraine) introduces advanced tactics like FPV drone strikes.
Implications for Security in Africa
The growing use of drones by insurgents and terrorists poses significant challenges to African security:
Asymmetric Advantage: Drones provide these groups with crude airpower, enabling them to strike fortified or remote targets without risking fighters’ lives. This shifts the balance of power, complicating military responses.
Psychological Impact: The unpredictability of drone attacks amplifies fear among civilians and security forces, enhancing the propaganda value of even small-scale operations.
Countermeasures Lag: Many African militaries lack robust anti-drone technology, such as jamming devices or laser systems, leaving them vulnerable to this evolving threat.
Escalation Risk: As groups like JNIM and ISWAP experiment with weaponized drones, the potential for mass-casualty attacks or strikes on critical infrastructure (e.g., energy facilities) increases.
Conclusion
The use of drones by insurgents and terrorists in Africa marks a new chapter in the continent’s security landscape. From Al-Shabaab’s surveillance flights in Somalia to JNIM’s FPV drone strikes in Burkina Faso, these groups are leveraging technology to enhance their operational capabilities.
While their current focus remains on ISR and propaganda, the experimentation with weaponized drones signals a dangerous trajectory. Real-life instances across Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Mozambique, and the DRC underscore the urgency of addressing this threat.
African governments and their international partners must prioritize early warning systems, regulate drone markets, and invest in counter-drone technologies. Without proactive measures, the continent risks a future where drones become a staple of insurgent arsenals, further destabilizing already fragile regions. As the technology continues to evolve, so too must the strategies to contain its misuse by those intent on violence.
The increasing use of drones by non-state actors in Northern Mali for both surveillance and direct combat roles presents a growing challenge for regional militaries. This development not only escalates the technological arms race but also underscores the urgent need for comprehensive counter-UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) strategies. African nations, particularly those in conflict zones, are now compelled to bolster their defenses against such aerial threats.
