The Iran war is unlikely to be short, precise, or containable. The current trajectory points towards a measured and growing confrontation. Tehran has prepared for this scenario for decades. The gradual escalation it is now showing suggests that it is bracing for a longer conflict. More sophisticated missile capabilities and proxies are being held back. During the earlier 12-day confrontation, Iranian attacks intensified roughly a week into hostilities. Progression in a similar manner is possible, particularly if the United States resorts to ground troops.
The implications of this war are immediate and structural for the Horn of Africa and Red Sea corridor. This region is not detached from its neighbourhood, and trends that already reshape the region will accelerate.
Immediate economic shockwaves
African markets already feel the disruptions and uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz and Red Sea. Shipping insurance premiums are rising and fuel prices climbing. Landlocked countries Ethiopia, South Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi are seeing increasing transport costs.
Fertiliser supply is also a critical concern. Continued disruption could hit agricultural production in fragile economies, exacerbating food insecurity and inflation. In countries with incoming elections, such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, or South Sudan, rising prices and fuel shortages could quickly lead to social unrest.
Countries in the Horn have little economic buffer, with governments already stretched fiscally. If the crisis continues, their fiscal space will shrink and reduce capacity to subsidise fuel, maintain food imports, or service debt. For countries like Ethiopia and Kenya, with exposure to private capital markets, liquidity pressure can catch up quickly. Indeed, the Gulf is already showing signs of remittance interruptions. The effects of this will be felt immediately at every level.
The question is not whether the war affects the Horn, but how deeply and for how long.
Unity under strain in the gulf
There is now unity among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states over a shared threat. However, any underlying rivalries still remain. Relations may shift over different approaches to Iran, particularly between Saudi Arabia and Türkiye.
Several GCC states are situated directly within the confrontation zone of the United States, Israel, and Iran. Security guarantees of the US are thus much less reliable, which could drive new militarisation and defence partnerships – with Türkiye, for example.
Horn states are expressing solidarity across the GCC divide, reflecting both economic dependency and strategic caution.
Iran War: Red Sea security in focus
Iran’s focus has so far been the Strait of Hormuz. There is tension in the Red Sea, but no real movement yet as Iran’s ally, the Houthis, have not entered the war.
Tehran may be holding this as a card to play for later escalation, or the Houthis may be calculating Saudi Arabia’s posture before engaging in a significant manner. Their capabilities may also be depleted due to their engagement regarding the Gaza war or economic strain.
However, if the war expands into the Bab el-Mandeb corridor, the Horn will move from secondary impact zone to the frontlines. Djibouti, Berbera, and other strategic ports could become exposed, either directly or through economic spillover.
Sudan: diplomatic bandwidth and escalation risk
Sudan risks losing diplomatic attention, particularly from Quad members UAE, Saudi Arabia, and the United States as their focus shifts towards Iran. This reduces pressure for a ceasefire and escalate conflict due to miscalculations.
Tension between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (Burhan) and Sudan’s Islamist factions are reportedly heightened over positioning towards Iran. Additionally, Port Sudan, given its strategic location on the Red Sea, could become a target if perceived as aligned with one side of the regional confrontation.
Somalia and Somaliland: high exposure, high fragility
With international focus elsewhere, the Somali federal government is advancing its electoral and constitutional agenda. With no internal consensus, unilateral moves may deepen fragmentation with Puntland and Jubaland in particular. Additionally, Somaliland could be a target for Houthi attacks if Berbera is perceived to have Israeli ties.
Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab may view the geopolitical distraction as an opportunity to regroup or intensify operations.
Ethiopia: economic shock meets existential politics
Political discourse in Ethiopia remains focused on access to the sea as well as the tensions with Eritrea and Tigray. Additionally, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s outreach to Qatar and Kuwait appears to signal diversified Gulf ties beyond the UAE.
The government’s precautionary stockpiling of fuel has likely increased already high fuel prices – fertiliser and fuel shortages materialising simultaneously may intensify domestic pressures quickly. There is also a risk for strategic miscalculation. If leaders assume the international community is distracted, the threshold for escalation towards war may lower.
Broader security risks across the continent
There is a heightened risk of terrorist attacks framed through sectarian or “holy war” narratives. In Nigeria, networks linked to the Islamic Movement of Nigeria have long been scrutinised for alleged Hezbollah connections. Across parts of West and East Africa, some Lebanese business communities have been accused of having financial ties to Hezbollah. Whether these networks activate substantially remains uncertain, but narrative escalation can mobilise non-state actors.
The breakdown of international law norms presents its own risks. Governments may perceive reduced enforcement or attention, encouraging latent border disputes or settling scores. However, the US government has demonstrated a retained bandwidth beyond Iran, as exhibited by the sanctioning of the Rwanda Defence Force within days of the war’s onset.
Critical indicators to watch
- Red Sea activation – Houthi attacks on shipping or assets in Djibouti or Berbera would mark a decisive shift.
- Sudan’s internal rift – Deepening fractures between Burhan and Islamist factions; supply line disruptions; opportunistic offensives.
- Ethiopian signalling – Military or rhetorical escalation toward Tigray or Sudan amid accusations of hostile drone attacks on Port Sudan from Ethiopia.
- Food and fuel security – Fertiliser shortages, stock depletion, and inflation-linked unrest.
- Somalia’s constitutional timeline – April/May processes imposed without consensus could fracture the federal system further.
- Escalation geography – Iranian targeting of additional countries, activation of new proxies, or strikes on critical infrastructure (e.g., desalination plants in the Gulf) would broaden the war’s footprint.
- Livestock exports – Interruptions to Gulf-bound livestock trade, particularly affecting Somalia and Kenya.
- Debt and liquidity stress – Signs of remittance interruption, widening spreads, and constrained fiscal space.
Multilateral response
Regional bodies, the East African Community, IGAD, and the African Union, must address the war’s economic and security effects on the Horn directly. The issue is not rhetorical alignment, but mitigation: debt relief flexibility, emergency social safety nets, and coordinated maritime security responses.
If Western creditors are slow to create fiscal breathing space, others actors, such as China and the Gulf states, may step in with alternative arrangements. This would carry long-term geopolitical consequences.
The Iran war is unlikely to create entirely new dynamics in the Horn of Africa. Instead, it will intensify existing fault lines: economic fragility, proxy competition, political transitions, and unresolved conflicts. The region’s greatest risk is not immediate collapse, but miscalculation under distraction.
Read also: Why the Escalating U.S.-Israel-Iran Crisis Threatens to Reverse Africa’s Inflation Fight
