Uganda and China signed a bilateral military agreement on 18 September 2025 that expands exchanges in professional education, joint exercises, and technology transfer. General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces, and General Liu Zhenli of China’s Central Military Commission sealed the deal in Beijing. This step bolsters Uganda’s capabilities amid East African instability and fits China’s pattern of defence partnerships across the continent.
Military relations between Uganda and China date to 1986, when the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) began formal co-operation after the National Resistance Movement took power. Ties were built on earlier diplomatic links established in 1962, with China providing early support through training and infrastructure aid. Over the decades, the partnership grew to include peace support operations and equipment donations, reflecting Uganda’s need for affordable defence tools and China’s interest in African security forums.
The recent agreement emerged from talks on mutual strategic interests, led by Kainerugaba and Liu after official welcomes in Beijing. Kainerugaba, who assumed the Chief of Defence Forces role in 2024, has pursued such outreach aggressively. His 2025 itinerary included visits to Rwanda in early years for joint command discussions, South Sudan in August to address border tensions, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in June to advance anti-rebel efforts. In Kampala, he hosted delegations from France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Beijing trip overlapped with the 12th Xiangshan Forum from 17 to 19 September, where defence leaders debated Asia-Pacific and global threats. During the visit, Kainerugaba toured the facilities of the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC), a state firm focused on aviation exports.
The agreement targets deeper technology transfer, particularly in aviation, as shown by the CATIC tour on 17 September. CATIC handles exports of fighter jets, transports, and unmanned systems, often tailored for developing air forces. Uganda’s air wing relies on a mix of Soviet-era survivors and newer acquisitions, but Chinese platforms offer low-cost sustainment. For instance, the UPDF operates six Harbin Y-12B twin-engine transports, acquired in the early 2010s for troop movement and surveillance, with a range of 730 nautical miles and capacity for 19 passengers. Two Xian MA60 turboprops, bought around 2012, extend utility for regional patrols, carrying 66 troops over 1,280 nautical miles at 265 knots.
These assets integrate with Uganda’s broader fleet, including Mi-24 attack helicopters from Russia and Bell 206 scouts from the United States. Chinese options appeal due to price: a Y-12 costs under $10 million per unit, half the tag of comparable Western twins like the Beechcraft King Air. Trade-offs appear in reliability; MA60s have faced criticism for avionics glitches in hot climates, though upgrades via CATIC could address this. The pact may enable local maintenance hubs, reducing downtime from 20 per cent in Uganda’s fleet to under 10 per cent through shared parts.
Beyond aviation, co-operation covers ground systems. Uganda has been fielding two WZ-551 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles from China since 2021, armed with 25mm cannons and able to carry nine troops at 65 mph. Recent joint ventures, like an April 2024 NORINCO deal for unmanned aerial vehicle assembly in Nakasongola, promise domestic production. This setup contrasts with pricier U.S. Strykers, emphasising Uganda’s pivot to volume over sophistication.
Chinese systems lack NATO-standard links, complicating multinational ops. Yet, with China’s $10 million equipment donation in July 2025—including logistics vehicles—the UPDF gains volume for peacekeeping without straining its $500 million annual defence spend.
The pact eases Uganda’s logistics for East African missions, where UPDF troops number over 5,000 in Somalia under African Union auspices. Joint exercises could simulate counter-insurgency, drawing on China’s experience in border patrols. Training ramps up, too: China has hosted hundreds of Ugandan officers annually at PLA academies, covering tactics and engineering. Local programs, like Chinese-language courses started in March 2024 at Nakasongola, prepare units for integrated ops.
Deployment shifts follow. Enhanced aviation support aids rapid response to Allied Democratic Forces threats in the DRC, with Y-12s ferrying squads over 300 miles in hours. Fuel and spare parts from CATIC streamline basing at Entebbe, cutting resupply waits from days to hours. Crew familiarisation demands six-month cycles, but shared curricula with Chinese advisors—now posted in Kampala—shorten this to three months.
Uganda gains practical edges in training and affordable tech from the China pact, fortifying its role in regional stability. Analysts see balanced diversification as Kainerugaba courts multiple partners without over-reliance. Defence planners should monitor integration challenges to maximise gains.
