Mali’s capital, Bamako, buzzed with military precision on September 23, 2025, as the nation’s Armed Forces marked the 65th anniversary of independence with a parade that doubled as a stark demonstration of evolving defence capabilities.
Rows of freshly delivered Chinese armoured vehicles rumbled down the avenues, flanked by artillery pieces and rocket systems, signalling a deepening partnership with Beijing amid ongoing insurgencies in the Sahel. This display came just weeks after a major shipment crossed the border from Guinea, underscoring Mali’s push to bolster its ground forces with modern, versatile platforms suited to the region’s unforgiving terrain and asymmetric threats.
The parade featured an array of equipment from Norinco, China’s state-owned defence giant, which has emerged as a key supplier to Bamako over the past three years. Observers counted five SR5 multiple rocket launchers rolling in formation; these truck-mounted systems, capable of saturating targets with up to 40 unguided rockets in a single salvo, appeared configured for 122 mm munitions, a lighter load than the heavier calibres the platform can handle. Flanking them were five CS/SH1 self-propelled howitzers, each a 122 mm gun perched on a rugged 6×6 chassis that allows for rapid repositioning in Mali’s dusty savannas. Completing the artillery contingent were five CS/SM5 mortars, 120 mm smoothbores elevated on CTL-181 6×6 carriers, offering indirect fire support with a range exceeding 7 kilometres when paired with modern targeting aids.
These pieces formed the backbone of the ground display, but the real attention-grabbers were the tactical combat vehicles themselves. At least 24 CS/VP14 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles, or MRAPs, stood out with their V-shaped hulls designed to deflect blasts from roadside explosives, a common hazard in Mali’s counter-terrorism patrols. Built on a 4×4 wheelbase, the CS/VP14 tips the scales at around 12 tons and can carry up to 10 troops plus a crew of two, all shielded by composite armour rated to withstand 6 kg of TNT under the hull. Its diesel engine delivers speeds up to 100 km/h on roads, dropping to a capable 60 km/h off-road, making it ideal for the rapid reaction forces Mali deploys against jihadist groups in the north and centre.
Joining the MRAPs were nine VN22 armoured personnel carriers and six VN22B variants, both 6×6 designs that blend mobility with firepower. The standard VN22, observed with a one-man turret mounting a 14.5 mm heavy machine gun over a coaxial 7.62 mm, provides protected transport for a squad of 12 while navigating Mali’s laterite tracks. The VN22B steps up the lethality with a 105 mm rifled gun in a remote turret, drawing from proven Chinese export designs like those on the ZTD-05 light tank; this setup allows for direct fire against light armour or bunkers at ranges beyond 2 kilometres, with a rate of fire around six rounds per minute. Also on hand were three CTL-181A light tactical vehicles, nimble 4×4 scouts akin to up-armoured Humvees, and two patrol boats for riverine operations along the Niger, though their exact models remained unspecified.
This haul arrived in Bamako in early September, convoyed overland from the port of Conakry in neighbouring Guinea; reports indicate a total order of 160 such vehicles from Norinco, with the September batch including two CS/SH1 howitzers for added tube artillery punch. Earlier shipments in late July and early August had brought more CS/VP14s alongside Dongfeng EQ2050 multi-purpose trucks, versatile 4×4 platforms that double as troop carriers or logistics hauliers in Mali’s vast operational theatres. The reliance on Conakry as an entry point highlights the practical challenges of arming a landlocked nation; Mali lacks deep-water access, so these acquisitions depend on bilateral logistics pacts with coastal allies, a factor that has drawn Guinea into Bamako’s defence orbit.
The CS/VP14’s debut in Mali marks a notable shift, as Kenya had been its sole confirmed operator before this year. Norinco has marketed the vehicle aggressively in Africa, touting its balance of protection and affordability, but selective exports suggest Beijing weighs strategic alignment in its deals. Mali’s inclusion points to a deliberate cultivation of ties, especially since the 2020 coup that installed Colonel Assimi Goïta’s junta. Goïta’s government has pivoted away from Western partners, expelling French and UN forces by late 2023, and filling the void with Russian mercenaries and now Chinese hardware. This diversification addresses immediate gaps in Mali’s inventory, where ageing Soviet-era gear from the Cold War era struggles against mobile insurgent tactics.
Flash back to March 2023, and the pattern emerges clearly. Fresh off the French withdrawal, which stripped away logistics and air support, FAMA uncrated dozens of VP11 4×4 lightweight MRAPs and Lynx CS/VP11 all-terrain vehicles, both Norinco products tailored for low-intensity conflict. The VP11, a compact 6-ton beast with modular armour kits, excels in urban chokepoints like Kidal or Gao, where it can shrug off small-arms fire and RPGs while ferrying fireteams to contact. Its Lynx sibling adds off-road prowess with independent suspension, allowing it to ford 0.8 meters of water or climb 60% gradients, features that shine in the Sahel’s seasonal floods and escarpments. These arrivals stabilised FAMA’s posture at a low point, enabling offensives that reclaimed territory from al-Qaeda affiliates and Islamic State splinters.
By June 2023, momentum built with a second wave: WZ-551 wheeled infantry fighting vehicles, 6×6 behemoths armed with 30 mm autocannons and anti-tank missiles, rolled in alongside extra VP11s. Photos from Conakry showed over 70 flatbeds unloading the cargo, a testament to the scale of Mali’s rearmament. The WZ-551, with its eight-wheel drive and 500 hp engine, hauls a crew and six dismounts at 85 km/h, its turret slinging high-explosive rounds to suppress enemy positions from 2.5 kilometres out. Deployed in combined arms teams, these IFVs complement Mali’s infantry-heavy doctrine, turning foot patrols into mechanised thrusts that disrupt supply lines in the desert badlands.
Fast-forward to September 2024, and the relationship formalised further. Defence Minister Sadio Camara inked a deal in Beijing with Norinco’s leadership, encompassing not just vehicles but training regimens and technology transfers; specifics stayed under wraps, but the accord promises to localise maintenance, reducing Mali’s dependence on foreign technicians. This builds on a trajectory where Chinese exports now dominate FAMA’s wheeled fleet, offering cost-effective alternatives to pricier Western options. Norinco’s edge lies in customisation; Malian variants often incorporate desert filters and reinforced undercarriages, adaptations born from field trials in the Timbuktu sands.
Yet Mali’s arsenal isn’t purely Sino-centric. In January 2024, a sprawling convoy snaked through Bamako, laden with over 100 pieces of Russian kit: T-72B3M main battle tanks with reactive armor and thermal sights, BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles packing 100 mm guns alongside their 30 mm cannons, BTR-82A 8×8 APCs for high-mobility ops, and lighter Spartak, Linza, and Tiger 4x4s. Towed D-30 122 mm howitzers, ZU-23 anti-air guns, and patrol boats rounded out the load. Analysts link this bounty to Syria’s post-Assad chaos, rerouted via back channels to bolster Wagner Group remnants, rebranded as Africa Corps, who embed with FAMA against shared foes. Absent from the September parade, these assets likely deploy forward, their absence a tactical choice to keep parade optics focused on state-provided gear rather than mercenary muscle.
The aerial element added drama to the event. Two Sukhoi Su-24 swing-wing bombers, flown by Africa Corps pilots, streaked overhead in a low pass; Janes reports they’ve logged over 78 flight hours this year alone, striking jihadist camps with precision-guided munitions in support of ground pushes. Three L-39 Albatros light attack jets followed, nimble platforms for close air support armed with rockets and bombs. An Mi-8/17 utility helicopter provided transport cover, while two Mi-24 Hind gunships, with their chin turrets bristling 12.7 mm guns and rocket pods, evoked Cold War firepower. An An-26 twin-turboprop rounded out the formation, hauling cargo or troops as needed. This flyby not only showcased integrated air-ground ops but also hinted at expanded Russian technical aid, with the Su-24s basing out of makeshift strips near Gao.
A quieter addition caught the eye of signals specialists: two ACMAT VLRA light trucks, French-designed 4x4s now repurposed with communications shelters and satellite dishes. Operated by the DTTIA, Mali’s Directorate of Telecommunications and Information Technology, these rigs enable encrypted voice nets and real-time drone feeds, bridging the gap between forward units and Bamako command. Their first parade appearance suggests recent upgrades, perhaps tied to Chinese tech transfers, enhancing FAMA’s battlespace awareness in an era of drone swarms and cyber skirmishes.
Taken together, this parade paints a portrait of a military in transition. Mali faces a hydra of threats; Tuareg rebels in the Adrar des Ifoghas, Islamist holdouts in the Mopti region, and spillover from Burkina Faso’s instability demand a force that’s mobile, resilient, and self-reliant. Chinese vehicles fill that bill without the strings of condition-based aid from Europe or the U.S., which Bamako views as meddlesome. The Norinco influx has swelled FAMA’s mechanized brigades, enabling battalion-level maneuvers that outpace insurgents on motorcycles. Russian heavies and airpower provide the heavy punch, while Wagner’s footprint ensures deniability in messy ops.
Logistics remain the Achilles’ heel. Overland hauls from Conakry chew time and expose convoys to ambush, a vulnerability FAMA mitigates with escort screens of those very VP11s. Regional alliances, like the Alliance of Sahel States with Niger and Burkina Faso, pool port access and intel, but sanctions on the junta crimp funding. Still, Beijing’s stake grows; beyond hardware, Chinese firms eye Mali’s gold and uranium, blending commerce with security.
As FAMA integrates this kit, expect field reports of CS/VP14s in ambushes near Tessalit or VN22Bs dueling pickups in the Douentza plains. The parade wasn’t mere pomp; it was a declaration. Mali’s forces, once reliant on outsiders, now roll on their own wheels, guns trained outward. In a Sahel where alliances shift like dunes, this self-sufficiency buys breathing room, one armored convoy at a time.
