“At every problem, there was a chance to turn back,” said Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure Dean Macpherson. “But because of a weak regulatory environment, there was either no incentive or requirement to do so. And this is what makes me so angry when I view this tragedy from today’s perspective — it was entirely preventable.”
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Macpherson was speaking at a media briefing on Saturday, 19 July 2025 following the release of investigation findings into the collapse of the partially constructed apartment building at 75 Victoria Street, George in May last year. The five-storey structure crumbled while under construction, killing 34 people and injuring 28 others.
The Minister described the disaster as a “lethal convergence of failures,” highlighting how early warning signs were ignored, critical roles were mishandled, and oversight mechanisms failed at every level.
The investigation confirmed that serious safety concerns were raised well before the collapse. Workers had observed visible cracks in support columns, strange vibrations in the slab, and even gaping holes in basement walls — some of which were reported as early as 2023.
Yet instead of halting work or escalating the issues, site managers allegedly instructed workers to patch the damage with sand and mortar.
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A major contributing factor, according to Macpherson, was a breakdown in regulatory oversight. There was poor co-ordination between authorities, and professionals were allowed to self-assess their competence without independent verification.
“The so-called ‘competent person’ overseeing the structural system did not have the necessary qualifications to manage a project of this scale,” Macpherson said.
He also criticised the current system which permits engineers to declare themselves fit for complex projects without rigorous external evaluation. “This loophole must be closed, and urgently.”
Material failures and missing studies
Another major failure lay in the materials used. “The concrete delivered for the slabs was well below specification. Where 19 to 25 megapascal was required, only 13 was delivered. This is a material failure of the most basic kind,” Macpherson said.
The geotechnical study — crucial for assessing soil stability and groundwater risk — was found to be incomplete and grossly deficient. Several key tests and geological maps were missing from the report.
Even more concerning, the Health and Safety Agent assigned to monitor compliance reportedly resigned midway through the project, citing unsafe conditions. “This resignation was never formally reported — a dereliction of duty that should have stopped the project in its tracks,” the Minister added.
Accountability and next steps
In the wake of the collapse, the Council for the Built Environment (CBE), a statutory body under the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure, launched a full-scale investigation into the systemic failures.
The Engineering Council of South Africa (ECSA), one of six councils under the CBE, also conducted a separate inquiry into the culpability of the engineer involved. That report has now been completed and will be published in the Government Gazette once the appeal window — which closes on Sunday, 3 August 2025 — has passed.
“This report must form part of the police investigation,” said Macpherson. “We must establish whether criminal negligence occurred. If it did, prosecutions must follow without delay. No contractor, engineer, or official should be beyond the reach of the law.”
Macpherson concluded with a call for urgent reform of the regulatory framework governing construction in South Africa, saying the country cannot allow such tragedies to be repeated.
“We must ensure that people are held accountable for the 34 souls who lost their lives.”
