For many parts of the world, elections are not unadulterated celebrations of democracy. In much of Africa, elections can be an anxious, and even violent, ritual. In 2007, then-Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo quipped that elections are “do-or-die affairs.”
Whether or not elections will turn violent primarily depends on the consent of the losers.
For many parts of the world, elections are not unadulterated celebrations of democracy. In much of Africa, elections can be an anxious, and even violent, ritual. In 2007, then-Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo quipped that elections are “do-or-die affairs.”
Whether or not elections will turn violent primarily depends on the consent of the losers.
The losers’ consent, in turn, depends on their belief in democracy, as well as trust in the credibility and fairness of the democratic system. The losers must believe that the victor won fair and square, and, crucially, that the winner will not seek to take undue advantage of the victory to reward loyalists and punish detractors.
As the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol shows, election violence is not simply the exclusive preserve of what Donald Trump derisively called “shithole countries.” Indeed, as a polarized U.S. electorate enters a knife-edge election, Americans could stand to learn a lot from Africa.
Ethiopia offers one cautionary tale. In the run-up to its 2020 general election (which was ultimately postponed to 2021), the ruling party was accused of using the security apparatus and other state institutions to dismantle the opposition in key regions where it could potentially lose, including Tigray and Oromia, where Prime MinisterAhmed is from.
Some of the opposition candidates were murdered by unknown assailants. Opposition parties therefore lost not only confidence in the fairness of the election, but also in the commitment of the ruling party to govern fairly. This forced key opposition parties to boycott the election. A loss of confidence in peaceful electoral processes then led to a surge for support for groups that resorted to armed struggle to advance their causes.
Ethiopia also offers some lessons in how the broader political framework can undermine electoral credibility and increase the chances of violence. Ethnic identity is the foundation of the country’s constitutional and political framework, and there has long been a rivalry between the largest groups: Oromo, Amhara, Somali, and Tigrayan. This has led to intense competition both within and between ethnic groups. To outbid competing parties within the same ethnic group, ethnic factions tend to take extreme positions, often defined in reference to other (enemy) groups. In particular, politics in Oromia has been defined by strong anti-Amhara sentiment.
The pivot toward identity politics, formally or informally, heightens electoral rhetoric and the possibilities for violent struggle to advance political objectives. Ethiopia’s government postponed the 2020 elections, citing the COVID-19 pandemic, but the postponement was contested by some groups. Because there is no effective electoral dispute resolution mechanism, what should have been a difficult but ultimately technical issue of constitutional interpretation turned out to be a prelude to Africa’s biggest war in recent memory, pitting the federal government and its allies against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). The electoral postponement proved to be the last stroke of intense rivalry between Abiy, Ethiopia’s new strongman, and the TPLF, the deposed party that dominated the previous regime.
In Gambia, the fracturing of an opposition coalition, which came together to unseat President Yahya Jammeh in the 2016 presidential election, increased tensions and threats of violence in the run-up to the 2021 election. In light of this, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance facilitated the development of a code of conduct for all presidential candidates, including a commitment to publicly denounce violence and intimidation. This contributed to a relatively calm political environment. The presence of eminent national guarantors and a strong partnership with civil society organizations to monitor compliance with the code of conduct strengthened its effectiveness.
The role of guarantors and civil society is critical, as a similar approach in the 2023 Nigerian presidential election—which lacked guarantors and a civil society partnership—had limited impact on enhancing trust in the electoral process and in reducing violence and intimidation.
Nigeria, Africa’s most populous democracy, has witnessed repeated alternations of parties and presidential power. But elections continue to be precarious and violent experiences, with electoral costs rising while the quality of the elections seems to be diminishing, leading to a crisis of confidence in the electoral process and low voter turnout. In Nigeria’s 2023 election, only 27 percent of eligible voters cast a ballot.
Local community-based initiatives can also enhance confidence in the election process and management, as well as improve relations between the public and local election and security actors, reducing the chances of violence—even when national elites resort to divisive and violent rhetoric.
In addition, to reduce people’s susceptibility to violence, it is crucial to promote the electoral system to ensure that the rules, institutions, and systems are known and clearly understood.
Ultimately, the prevention of electoral violence in an age of social media and populist rhetoric depends on the perception of fairness of not only the elections, but also the broad political framework. If the sense of satisfaction with the political system is high, the possibilities for violence are likely to be low. This requires designing legitimate electoral and political systems (starting from the primaries that incentivize moderation) and constant vigilance to nurture and reinforce a civic-minded citizenry, which is the foundation of an improved infrastructure of peace and democracy.
Elections are not good ways of resolving fundamental differences and can be destabilizing in contexts where the rules of the game and historical narratives are contested. Therefore, it is crucial to first resolve foundational disputes, such as autonomy of distinct groups and the federal structure of the state through broad dialogue in a manner that avoids winner-takes-all politics, and rely on elections to resolve second-order policy differences like tax rates and immigration policy.
The dilemma is that constitutional features that reduce winner-takes-all politics, such as proportional electoral systems, checks and balances, power-sharing mechanisms, and relatively autonomous and apolitical bureaucracy, are often attacked by populist leaders on the grounds that such measures stand in the way of the majority’s will and that only they can genuinely represent the people’s will. Violent rhetoric may therefore become a deliberate populist strategy.
And violence cascades down from the top. The narrative of violence often starts with elite attacks on the credibility of the elections and even the broader democratic system. To reduce the chances of violence, it can help to push political leaders (and major media institutions) to abide by a set of agreements (codes of conduct) regarding inflammatory rhetoric and fair media coverage. Identifying risks, along with preventing and mitigating political violence, must be a fundamental and continuous endeavor.
It is not simply what happens on the day of an election that matters for electoral violence. The broader system determines the tolerance of losing political groups and candidates; it determines the level of protection that losers will receive, including rewards for the political minority that increase the chances of acceptance of electoral outcomes. In fact, if the system does not enjoy broad buy-in, elections may be seen as legitimizing and reinforcing an unfair system.
In places where the electoral stakes are so high and the strength of democratic institutions is low because of the winner-takes-all nature of the political framework, political competition is not merely to set policy, but to capture the state apparatus. In such contexts, the incentives to resort to overpromising, vote-buying, voter suppression, intimidation, and violence are high, both for ruling and opposition parties. Such winner-take-all systems are incompatible with free, fair, and credible elections. Accordingly, all committed democracies need to shun such systems and instead seek to enhance the protection of minorities, transparency, and inclusiveness in their electoral systems.
